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INTRODUCTION

From Kenya to Afghanistan, Ukraine, the United States, Mexico, and
Iran, no region or form of government has been immune from the unsettling effects of a contested election. The story is familiar, and, these
days, hardly surprising: a state holds elections, losing candidates and
their supporters claim fraud, people take to the streets, diplomats and
heads of state equivocate, and everyone waits for the observers' reports.
It is the last chapter of this story-the resolution-that remains unfamiliar and still holds the potential to surprise. The increasing focus on and
importance of the resolution of contested elections, that resolution's link
to the fundamental human rights of the voters and of the candidates, and
its underlying threat to internal and external stability all directly affect
not only the election-holding state but also the international community
writ large.
The legal framework underlying contested elections is unsettled.
U.N. and regional treaties have enshrined a right to political participation, the most easily definable element of which is the specific right to
free and fair elections.' International organizations have devised comprehensive standards and practices for observing elections and for
pronouncing their legitimacy or lack thereof.2 Protections abound in in1.
The "right to political participation" refers to the broader right to participation in
government, only one element of which is the "right to free and fair elections." Therefore, the
two concepts are not interchangeable, but rather the latter is a subsidiary right of the former.
For examples of such rights in international treaties, see International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. See also African Union, African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.africaunion.org/root/AUIDocuments/Treaties/text/Charter%2Oon%2ODemocracy.pdf (not yet in force);
Organization of American States [OAS], Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11, 2001,
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.l, 40 I.L.M. 1289 (2001); OAS, American Convention on
Human Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20,
1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol No. 1]; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. But
see African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights art. 13, July 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CABILEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1992) (including no right to free and fair elections in its
political participation provision).
2.
See, e.g., OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS [ODIHR], ORG. SEC.
& CO-OPERATION IN EUR. [OSCE], ELECTION OBSERVATION HANDBOOK (5th ed., rev. ed.
2007), available at http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/04/14004 240_en.pdf; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS AND CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS (2005), available at http://www.osce.org/

documents/odihr/2005/11/16968_en.pdf (endorsed by more than twenty intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS),
the United Nations Secretariat, the European Commission, and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)).
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ternational jurisprudence on the rights of an individual to cast a vote and
to stand as a candidate for election. 3 And yet, despite the fact that these
"front-end" participatory rights are only realized if the results are "genuine" or "authentic," 4 there has traditionally been little support in
international human rights law for ensuring the legitimacy of the "back
end" of the electoral process-that is, the right of a voter to have his vote
counted and to have the electoral result reflect the will of the people.'
This Note argues that this imbalance is diminishing and that a right to a
legitimate and accurate electoral result is emerging as a recognized and
fundamental component of the more-established right to free and fair
elections.
The evolution of this widely recognized right to vote has coincided,
with an increase in contested elections in the early years
surprisingly,
not
of the twenty-first century. The prevalence of disputed elections and the
politicization of what is perhaps the most inherently political individual
citizen action has been global,6 cross-cultural, and reflective of the
See infra Part I. For a broad overview of the jurisprudence of international organiza3.
tions, see generally ALEX CONTE ET AL., DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2004) (U.N. Human
Rights Committee (HRC)); PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2005) (ECHR); ARTURO SANTA-CRUZ, INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
MONITORING, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA: THE EMERGENCE OF AN

INTERNATIONAL NORM (2005) (OAS).
The term "genuine" derives from Article 21 of the Universal Declaration on Human
4.
Rights. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 21. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
defined "genuine" as "authentic" and uses authenticity as its legal standard for free and fair

elections. Cases 9768, 9780, 9828,
OEA/Ser.LN/II.77, doc. 7 rev. 1

Inter-Am. Comm'n

H.R., Report No. 1/90,

47 (1989-1990) [hereinafter Mexican Election Decisions]

("The act of electing representatives must be 'authentic' in the sense stipulated by the American Convention, implying that there must be some consistency between the will of the voters
and the result of the election.").
This Note refers to both "front-end" and "back-end" electoral rights. "Front-end"
5.
rights refer to the right to cast a vote, the right to run for office, and the other rights associated
with the input end of the electoral process. "Back-end" rights refer to the tabulating and announcing of results-that is, what comes out of the electoral process once votes have been
cast.
Recent contested elections include: United States (2000), the Former Yugoslavia
6.
(2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyz Republic (2005), Mexico (2006), Italy
(2006), Nigeria (2007), Kenya (2007-08), Iran (2009), and Afghanistan (2009). See, e.g., Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (United States); JONATHON WHEATLEY, GEORGIA FROM NATIONAL AWAKENING To ROSE REVOLUTION: DELAYED TRANSITION IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION 181-85 (2005) (Georgia); Calderon DeclaredMexico's President-Elect,MSNBC.com

(Sept. 5, 2006, 9:43:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14672039/ (Mexico); Ian Fisher,
For Berlusconi, Defeat Isn't End of Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006, at Al (Italy);
Kenya: A Very African Coup (Kenya's Contested Election), ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 160177 (Kenya); Lydia Polgreen, A Battle of Legal Briefs Rages over '07
Nigerian Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/25/world/
africa/25nigeria.htm (Nigeria); Timeline of an Uprising, BBC.com (Oct. 6, 2000, 3:15 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/959077.stm (Former Yugoslavia); Martha Brill Olcott,
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emerging right to democratic governance hailed by scholars in the
1990s.' Elections are high-stakes affairs, with the populace seeking the
expression of "the will of the people," and the government seeking le8
gitimacy on the world stage. The participatory rights inherent in the
electoral exercise are, therefore, obviously and exclusively political.'
The political nature of electoral rights has made them widely accepted but difficult to enforce or even to define.' Unlike the right to
associate or the right to free speech, the right to participate in governance through free and fair elections requires states to construct a de facto
political institution and regulatory framework to protect, maintain, and
facilitate those participatory rights." While all human rights carry some
positive and negative obligations, the positive obligations inherent in
creating the political structures necessary to realize the right to free and
fair elections can be particularly threatening to states because they require the government of a state to cede power to its citizens, who then
Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution," CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Mar. 28,

2005), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=l6710 (Kyrgyz Republic).
7.
For foundational literature on the right to democratic governance, see generally
DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Burchill ed., 2006); DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Richard
Burchill, The Developing International Law of Democracy, 64 MOD. L. REV. 123 (2001);
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990); Henry J. Steiner, PoliticalParticipationas
a Human Right, 1 HARv. Hum. RTs. Y.B. 77 (1988). But see Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology
of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589 (1996).
8.
Kenneth Roth, Despots Masquerading as Demons, in WORLD REPORT 2008 1, I

(Human Rights Watch ed., 2008) ("Rarely has democracy been so acclaimed yet so breached,
so promoted yet so disrespected, so important yet so disappointing. Today, democracy has
become the sine qua non of legitimacy."). The definition of "democracy" is beyond the scope

of this Note. Elections and democracy are not coextensive-democracy is a far more nuanced
and complex ideal. However, although human rights advocates often criticize democracy pro-

motion's emphasis on elections, elections remain an effective and necessary initial process in
democratization, see Thomas Carothers, Democracy and Human Rights: Policy Allies or Rivals?, WASH. Q., June 22, 1994, availableat 1994 WLNR 5297225, which many have argued
is the only way to safeguard fundamental human rights, see, e.g., YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELFDETERMINATION AND TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY 14 (1994). Thus, by focusing on electoral
rights, this Note does not suggest that the attainment of back-end electoral rights results in

democratic governance, it merely examines these rights as a necessary but alone insufficient
element of democratic governance. See Steven Wheatley, Democracy in InternationalLaw: A
European Perspective,51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 225, 236 (2002).
9.
See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 7, at 107.
10.
David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention, 19 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 659, 664-65 (1997).

11.
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 209; Fox, supra note
7, at 596; Michael Maley, Transplanting Election Regulation, 2 ELECTION L.J. 479, 479
(2003); Steiner, supra note 7, at 110.
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determine that government. Thus, the government is responsible for enforcing and protecting the very system that could remove it from power.
Consequently, an allegation of a violation-and a call for a remedy-can
involve a far greater intrusion into the domestic affairs and laws of a
state than do, for example, calls for the release of a political prisoner or
the establishment of a free opposition press.1 Electoral rights are also
complex because they inhere in the individual but are exercised in the
collective, complicating the identification and remedy of any breach.
Elections are diverse, expensive, and constitutive of the state itself.
The work of regional and international treaty organizations in defining the contours of the right to genuine elections has prompted some to
argue that these specific participatory rights, unlike the broader right-topolitical-participation provisions, are established and settled.14 This Note
argues that this confidence in the international recognition and enforceability of the right to free and fair elections is premature. Elections have
two components: what goes into the electoral process and what comes
out of it. Without assuring the authenticity of what comes out of the back
end of the process, the rights defined and secured by the international
human rights mechanisms on the front end remain vulnerable. While
international human rights instruments have traditionally provided insufficient support for back-end electoral rights, this Note argues that an
acceptance of the tautology that the fulfillment of front-end rights demands the observation of back-end rights is leading to an emerging legal
structure supportive of both ends of the electoral process.
This evolution of the electoral right has not been without hurdles.
The history of participatory rights, traditional notions of noninterference
in the internal affairs of a sovereign, and the difference in nature between
front-end and back-end electoral rights make enforcement of back-end
electoral rights less politically palatable and achievable for many states.
The practical and political realities of these heightened impediments to
enforcement continue to leave states and electorates challenging alleged
See Fox, supra note 7, at 596.
12.
By "genuine" elections, this Note refers to elections in which the outcome of the
13.
election reflects the free and fair casting of ballots and is seen to be a valid, accurate reflection
of the will of the electorate.
See, e.g., Wheatley, supra note 8, at 247 ("The elections aspects [of the obligation
14.
of democratic governance] [are] relatively easy to determine."); Wippman, supra note 10, at
667 ("[S]ubstantial international agreement now exists on many of the procedural and substantive prerequisites for free and fair elections."); see also Steiner, supra note 7, at 111.
15.
See Roth, supra note 8, at 2-3; Steiner, supra note 7, at 105 ("Elections may offer
relatively accessible or relatively closed avenues, real or sham avenues, toward the people's
participation in governance."). See generally Roth, supra note 8. The benefits to a government
perceived as legitimately elected by the people-and, conversely, the repercussions of apparent "sham" elections-are great and heighten the impetus for and stakes in manufacturing
"free and fair" elections.
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electoral fraud with little legal support outside of the oft-inadequate domestic political and judicial systems. This Note asserts that in Europe,
however, the unique confluence of a commitment to democratic governance, the presence of an established human rights court in the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court), and the more recent participation of post-Communist states in that supranational legal system is
accelerating the development of back-end electoral rights in European
human rights law.
Part I of this Note examines the evolution of the right to free and fair
elections and focuses on the establishment of the false dichotomy between the front and back ends of the electoral process. In Part II, this
Note examines the ECtHR's evolving jurisprudence concerning the right
to free and fair elections in Europe's Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention or
ECHR). While the ECtHR initially maintained a differentiation between
front-end and back-end electoral rights, recent cases emerging from
Greece, Turkey, and post-Communist Eastern Europe have forced the
Court to address back-end electoral rights directly. Although many of the
traditional structural impediments to enforcement of back-end electoral
rights remain, this Note posits that the Court is crafting case law within
that framework that could lay the foundation for a more widespread international recognition of back-end electoral rights. Finally, Part III
considers how an internationally recognized human right to free and fair
elections can bolster electoral rights and aid in the resolution of a contested election in an otherwise fragile domestic political environment.
While not a prescriptive example suitable for export, the judicial decision" that facilitated the political resolution of the 2004 Orange
Revolution in Ukraine illustrates the important role that international
human rights law could play in safeguarding back-end electoral rights
and resolving contested elections.

16.
Protocol No. 1,supra note 1,art. 3.
17.
Verkhovnyi Sud Ukrainy [Supreme Court of Ukraine] Dec. 3, 2004 (Ukr.),
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=nOO90700-04 [hereinafter Yushchenko].
For an unofficial but largely accurate English translation of the Ukrainian Supreme Court's
decision, see Decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine on the Results of the Run-Off Election
of the President, KHARKIv GROUP FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION (Feb. 26, 2005),

http://www.khpg.org/index.php?id=1 109413464&r--2&s=2004&n= 12.
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THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
AND BACK-END ELECTORAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Because the right to free and fair elections is the only specifically articulated element of the broader right to political participation recorded
and codified in international human rights treaties, the provisions establishing that subsidiary right deserve acute attention. The codification of
the right to free elections in regional and international human rights treaties has provided an opportunity for various international judicial bodies
such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR, and the
United Nations' Human Rights Council (HRC), which monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),' 8 to interpret the right in different contexts. The case law of
these international bodies makes this right more susceptible to evaluation
and enforcement by the international community than other less welldefined participatory rights that may emerge from the ether of the concept of "participatory rights" or "political rights." However, "[w]hat
escapes analysis in the contemporary understanding of international
norms on political participation is the quality and significance of electoral participation itself."'9
One of the impediments to the development and enforcement of
electoral rights is the traditional international legal norm of noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. In 1923, sitting as
arbitrator, Chief Justice William Howard Taft noted that "nonrecognition [of governments] on the ground of illegitimacy of origin was
not a postulate of international law and did not secure general acquiescence." 20 The U.N. Charter incorporated this principle into Articles 2(4)
and 2(7), which state, respectively, that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State . . ." and that

"[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic

jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter." 2' These provisions arose
18.
See ICCPR, supra note 1.
Steiner, supra note 7, at 113.
19.
Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1923-24 Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l L. Cas. 34, 37 (1923)
20.
(opinion of Taft, J.).
21.
U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 4, 7 (emphases added). See also Covenant of the League
of Nations art. 10 ("The Members ... undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the

League." (emphasis added)).
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out of the longstanding Westphalian, territorial understanding of sovereignty.22
Many in both the international relations and international law
fields, however, argue that the foundation of territorial sovereignty is
crumbling, especially with respect to the rights to democratic governance and to free and fair elections.25 The first cracks in its foundation
26
arose out of democratic peace theory and the belief that democratic
governments are less likely to go to war, that democracy prevents internal conflict, and that democratization is an inherent guarantor of
fundamental human rights in transitional justice. 27 The advent of human
rights treaties imposing on states' international obligations to respect and
promote human rights, including the right to genuine elections, also
brought the internal affairs of states out of "domestic jurisdiction" 28 and
into the international community. Thus, "[t]o the extent that States have
ratified these conventions, the (lack of) respect of national governments
for human rights no longer belongs to the exclusive domain of States.
These governments became accountable to the international community
or, more precisely, to the international organizations under whose auspices the conventions were prepared." 29 This evolution has led some
scholars to posit that, especially in Europe, where the Council of Europe,
the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) have made considerable progress toward codifyingor at least monitoring consistently-electoral rights,30 the concept of
22.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 287 (6th ed., 2003)
(noting that the principle corollaries of state sovereignty and equality are "(1) a jurisdiction,
prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there; (2) a duty of
non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence of
obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor").
23.
See, e.g., Alfred van Staden & Hans Vollaard, The Erosion of State Sovereignty:
Towards a Post-TerritorialWorld?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERN-

165, 171 (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002) ("Since 1945, the principle of international
protection of human rights has progressively gained weight at the cost of the orthodox, highly
ANCE

narrow interpretation of state sovereignty.").

24.

See generally sources cited supra note 7.

25.
Many scholars cite the proliferation of electoral monitoring as a main source of the
erosion of sovereignty with respect to electoral rights. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, Election
Monitoring: The InternationalLegal Setting, 19 WIs. INT'L L.J. 295, 302, 309-15 (2001).
26.
See SANTA-CRUZ, supra note 3, at 207-09 (tracing the origins of conceptions of

democratic peace theory from Immanuel Kant).
27.
Fox, supra note 25, at 304-06.
28.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
29.
van Staden & Vollaard, supra note 23, at 171.
30.
The Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission) has also been very active in this field. See Elections and Referendums,
Political Parties, VENICE COMM'N, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.venice.coe.int/
site/main/Elections.ReferendumsE.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2010). The Venice Commission
adopted a code of good practice to which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) often
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sovereignty has evolved from a territorial one into a functional one.
Indeed, the violation of electoral rights, coupled with political instability
and other human rights abuses, has led to U.N. Security Council inter32
vention in at least one case.
This Part first explores the concept of back-end electoral rights and
the traditional impediments to the enforcement of this particular element
of the right to free and fair elections. While some of the obstacles have
eroded over time, others remain a challenge to the evolution of an international legal framework for enforcing back-end electoral rights. This
Part then assesses the scope and development of the right to genuine
elections in the U.N. human rights system, including the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR, within the context of these traditional
impediments. Understanding the evolution of the U.N. treaties is a prerequisite to understanding the initial drafting of the right to free and fair
elections in the European Convention and the ECtHR's subsequent interpretation of that right.33
A. TraditionalImpediments to the Enforcement
of ParticipatoryRights

Certain characteristics unique to the right to political participation,
such as the infrastructure required to support it, its political sensitivity,
and its collective nature, 34 have frustrated the recognition of back-end
electoral rights as an international human rights norm, have limited the
scope of provisions establishing that right in international treaties, and
have created obstacles to its enforcement. These characteristics are more
pronounced with respect to alleged violations of back-end electoral
rights than with respect to those associated with front-end rights, which
cites in its Article 3 case law. See Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law (Venice
Comm'n), Code of Good Practicein ElectoralMatters, Op. No. 190/2002, CDL-AD(2002)23
(Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)023-e.pdf;
see, e.g., Petkov & Others v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 77568/01, 178/02, 505/02, 152 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. June 11, 2009), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search using application number).
van Staden & Vollaard, supra note 23, at 179-80. Functional sovereignty refers here
31.
to authority over designated sectors, rather than authority over designated territory. Id. at 180.
This kind of functional sovereignty most often coincides with territorial boundaries but has
increasingly included multiple sovereign states or even autonomous sub-units of a sovereign
state. See id. at 181-84 (discussing the European Union and its various levels of integration as
a prime example of this shifting concept of sovereignty).
See SANTA-CRUZ, supra note 3, at 200 (discussing the intervention in Haiti follow32.
ing the ousting of a legitimately elected president).
See, e.g., Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 198; U.N.
33.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs,
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25), U.N. Doc. No.
CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996) [hereinafter General Comment No. 25].
34.

See generally Franck, supra note 7, at 56-77.
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derive more generally from the universal international human rights
norms of equality, anti-discrimination, and personal autonomy and dignity. Back-end rights, by contrast, (1) provide a particularly strong
challenge to the traditional conceptions of sovereignty and nonintervention; (2) are less associated with the individual and more with
the collective; (3) resuscitate the Cold War apprehensions and suspicions
regarding the divide-artificial though it may be-between law and politics;" and (4) are therefore more difficult to identify and remedy. These
challenges are difficult to overcome because they all raise the traditional
specter of sovereignty as a barrier to definition, recognition, and enforcement of back-end electoral rights. While the argument that
international law now protects the sovereignty of the people's will to
choose their government over the traditional sovereignty of that government-"sovereignty of the sovereign became sovereignty of the people:
popular sovereignty"36-the sensitivity and nature of back-end political
rights, and their inconsistent (rather than universal) applicability to "citizens" seems only to resurrect the traditional territorial conception of
sovereignty. Thus, this "'[p]opular sovereignty' may well represent the
converging aspirations of many peoples around the globe, but the only
vehicle in which this particular human right may find meaningful expression remains-in all but the most exceptional of situationssovereignty of a more traditional kind."37
The various treaties establishing a right to political participation
arose within the historical context of Cold War ideological competition,
resulting in imprecise provisions providing more principle than prescription." Consequently, "it is not surprising that the earliest points of
agreement [with respect to electoral rights] have been on questions of
procedure: what is a 'free and fair' election; must more than one party
participate; must ballots be secret?"39 There was, however, an identifiable
aspiration and influence of liberal democracy in these treaty provisions,
35.

The separation of law and politics is the bedrock of judicial independence and the

rule of law. See generally Christopher M. Larkins, JudicialIndependence and Democratiza-

tion: Theoretical and ConceptualAnalysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1996); Peter H. Russell,
Toward a General Theory of JudicialIndependence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE
OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 1, 2 (Peter H. Russell &

David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
36.
Reisman, supra note 7, at 867. Reisman argues that the "old order," in which the
internal individual could not usurp sovereignty because control was the test of sovereignty, no
longer exists. Id. at 870.
37.
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, "You, the People": Pro-DemocraticIntervention in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 7, at 259, 261.
38.
See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, IntolerantDemocracies, in DEMOCRATIC GovERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 389, 433.
39.
Id.
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emphasizing the locus of state authority in the will of the people and the
necessity of elections-even when so broadly defined.4 The complexity
and sensitivity of political participation rights have led some scholars to
suggest that the right to political participation is a programmatic right,
more akin to those rights established in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights41 than to the more negative rights
of the ICCPR. 42 Regardless of how the rights are characterized, "[t]he
fight over rights therefore becomes the fight over the redistribution of
power-sometimes direct and unadorned, sometimes imbedded in ideological struggles or in complex ethnic conflicts." 43 That electoral
institutions and regulations are so complex and derive from domestic
law44 also suggests that any specific requirements or criticisms of the
underlying political institutions or laws could be perceived as paternalistic or neo-colonial.45
Identifying violations and appropriate remedies also hinders enforcing the right to free and fair elections, which inherently involves the
multiple perspectives of the individual voter, of the voters collectively,
46
and of the candidates seeking election by the voters. While it is easy to
assess the eligibility or intimidation of a specific individual voter on the
front end of the electoral process, it is more difficult to determine a violation of that individual's right to have his vote counted accurately on the
back end. This difficulty, ironically, arises from one of the strongest protections of a voter's front-end electoral rights: the secrecy of the ballot
casting process. Also, the ECtHR, for example, has found that both candidates and voters have standing to bring claims of violations of the right

40.

See generally Mutua, supra note 7.

41.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 23.
42.
See HOWARD DAVIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 236 (2003); Mutua,
supra note 7, at 593, 607 n.59; Steiner, supra note 7, at 130 (characterizing the right as a
"programmatic right, one responsive to a shared ideal but to be realized progressively over
time in different ways in different contexts through invention and planning that will often have
a programmatic character").
Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104 HARV. L. REV. 917, 931-32 (1990-1991)
43.
(reviewing LouIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990)).
44.
See generally Maley, supra note 11, at 481-85 (discussing the various sources of
regulation).
45.
Alex Conte, Democratic and Civil Rights, in DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 43, 68 ("In part, this [democratic-theory approach] might be viewed
as a troubling and slightly paternal approach: an approach that tends to undermine, rather than
respect, the different bases of political governorship."); see also U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 132d
plen. mtg., at 449, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.132 (Nov. 11, 1948); U.N. GAOR., 3d Sess., 133d
plen. mtg., U.N.Doc. A/C.3/SR.133 (Nov. 12, 1948); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 134th plen. mtg.
at 469, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.134 (Nov. 12, 1948).
46.
BEIGBEDER, supra note 8, at 30.
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to free and fair elections.47 However, such a finding requires an almost
artificial judicial construction because a single vote never (or rarely) determines the outcome of an election. Thus, it is "not always clear from
the [literature] who the holder of the right might be, and what legal interest other states might have in seeking to force compliance with the
international norm."48 Generally, this leaves the candidate to contest
questionable electoral results on behalf of the electorate, as opposed to
the voter challenging the results as the holder of the right.49 The voters,
without judicial recourse, are often left only with the remedy of protest
and political pressure to enforce their electoral rights. When no political
resolution is forthcoming, the voters' "remedy" can thus become a disturbingly destabilizing force.
This reliance on political will to enforce electoral rights is not surprising. The right to political participation, and to free elections, is
inherently political in a way that most other human rights are not:
The value of participatory rights is ...

inseparable from the

legitimation of political authority achieved by their exercise.
Participatory rights have little value in isolation where this link
to political authority is severed . .. . Those who participate in

elections do so in order to imprint their views on national policy,
and not simply to vote or stand as a candidate for its own sake.so
And, given the increased emphasis on democracy as legitimacy, the
desire and perceived need of a government to receive that proclamation
of "free and fair elections" from the international community has intensified." This leads to a gap between "the standards [that] governments
proclaim, or accept, or at least pay lip-service to, and the reality of their

47.
See I.Z. v.Greece, App. No. 18997/91, 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 65, 67
(1994) (decision on admissibility) (finding that an applicant "directly and personally affected
by the alleged irregularity in the exercise of his right to vote . . . may accordingly claim to be a
'victim' of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1").
48.
Wheatley, supra note 8, at 227.
49.
See, e.g., Yushchenko, supra note 17 (considering claims, brought by a presidential
candidate, alleging massive fraud that led to a result not reflecting the will of the voters); Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (considering a claim brought by one presidential candidate contesting the certification by state officials of electoral results).
50.
Fox, supra note 25, at 309.
51.

See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITU89-90 (1995); Karen E. Bravo, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Joker in the Pack: On
Transitioning to Democracy and the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Armenia, 29 Hous. J. INT'L L.
489, 509-11 (2007); Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. J.
TIONs

L. 1, 3-5, 61 (1995) ("In delineating proper electoral procedures, article 25 [of the
ICCPR] sets out a legal threshold of governmental legitimacy."); Sarah Williams, Has InternaINT'L

tional Law Hit the Wall? An Analysis of InternationalLaw in Relation to Israel's Separation
Barrier,24 BEREKELY J. INT'L L. 192, 206-07 (2006).
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52
practice in enforcing or suppressing [those] rights." The resulting intense scrutiny of election observation to monitor that gap, coupled with
the inescapably political nature of the participatory rights themselves,
exacerbates the tension between law and politics with respect to backend electoral rights.53 After all, an individual cannot exercise the right to
political participation without the aid of the state. The electoral process
requires a complex structure of statutes, regulations, decrees, and agency
decisions, all of which the government must establish, maintain, and
monitor despite its intense self-interest in the election results.
Election monitoring, hailed by some as the enforcer of the participatory right, is not immune from the suspicion of ulterior political
16
motives. Declaring a state's election to be unfair is perceived as a political-not legal-act." For example, the feud between the OSCE and
Russia is storied and ongoing." Thus, the presence and effectiveness of
election observers are often curtailed by political realities or nonrealities.
The United Nations, for instance, limits election missions to those that
meet certain conditions, including those with the greatest need and those
that fit within the resource constraints of the Electoral Assistance Division. 9 Because of those resource constraints, the United Nations rarely

Niall MacDermot, The Credibility Gap in Human Rights, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 262,
52.
262 (1976-1977).
See Fox & Nolte, supra note 38, at 434 ("International law has developed various
53.
mechanisms for separating actions with normative significance from 'mere' politics. Yet here
is a norm that is about politics .... Inevitably, even in the most optimistic scenario the strict
letter of these rules will be tempered to accommodate political exigencies.").
54.

See Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy and Collective Decision Making, 6 INT'L J.

L. 231, 233 (2008) ("All modem democracies channel an individual's democratic right
to participate in self-governance through complicated institutional arrangements."); Steiner,
supra note 7, at 85 ("A state cannot 'terminate' a given practice of political participation without instituting another. Particularly if it moves toward broader debate and heightened
participation, the new practice may be fatal to those in power.").
See infra Part II.D.
55.
CONsT.

See, e.g., Georgy Bovt, Comment, The 100 Percent Guarantee: Why the Kremlin
56.
Has to Keep Kasyanov and the OSCE at Bay, JOHNSON's Rus. LIST, No. 27, Feb. 7, 2008 (on
file with author); Christian Lowe & Conor Sweeney, Europe Watchdog Scraps Plans to Monitor Russia Vote, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2008, 3:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSL3011403920080207; Roman Kupchinsky, CIS: Monitoring the Election Monitors, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 2, 2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/

1058234.htmil.
Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: the Spread of Liberal Democracy
57.
and its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 1, 6 ("Such judgments sharply contradict the traditional

international law maxim that the selection of national leaders is quintessentially a matter of
exclusive domestic jurisdiction.").
See, e.g., Lowe & Sweeney, supra note 56.
58.
Rachel Ricker, Note, Two (or Five, or Ten) Heads Are Better Than One: The Need
59.
for an Integrated Effort to International Election Monitoring, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

1373, 1378 (2006).
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accepts an invitation to observe or assist in an election unless to do so
would further some other programmatic concern. Consequently, unlike
condemnation of many other human rights, there is a necessary connection between violations and continued normal relations with the state. 61
The political ramifications of enforcement of the right, therefore, act as
yet another impediment to both recognition and enforcement of backend electoral rights.
Accordingly, the nature of back-end electoral rights and their inherently political context continue to impede the recognition, establishment,
and enforcement of back-end electoral rights. Although some of the traditional sovereignty concerns have eroded somewhat, they remain
sufficiently robust to make an ongoing impact on the development of
back-end electoral rights.
B. The Right to Genuine Elections in U.N. Human Rights Instruments
An appreciation of the challenges facing the establishment and enforcement of electoral rights is necessary to understand how those rights
have evolved in international human rights law. The right to participation
in governance emerged from the ashes of World War II in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which stated that "[e]veryone has the
right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives."6 The only articulation of that right that
the Universal Declaration provided was that "[tihe will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
voting procedures."6 The travaux prdparatoiresof the Universal Declaration reveal that debates arose with respect to, inter alia, the secrecy of
the ballot, whether to require contested elections (a suggestion that was
withdrawn out of comity with the Communist states), and whether to
require equal suffrage. The drafting committee took special care to note
that, while the casting of ballots was to be secret, the counting was to be
public.6 This was the only reference to back-end electoral rights in the
travaux, perhaps because the delegates realized (and acknowledged) that
60.
Id. at 1379. Regional organizations, especially the OAS and OSCE, are less limited.
Id. at 1380-82; see also Margaret Satterthwaite, Note, Human Rights Monitoring, Elections
Monitoring, and ElectoralAssistance as Preventive Measures, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
709 (1998).
61.
Fox, supra note 25, at 296.
62.
UDHR, supra note 1,art. 21(a).
63.
Id. art. 21(3).
64.
See generally the traveauxprdparatoiresof the UDHR cited supra note 45.
65.
See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 134th plen. mtg., supra note 45, at 468-69; see also
Conte, supra note 45, at 73.
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fraudulent elections could continue to occur despite compliance with the
66
strict text of the provision.
The ICCPR, drafted during the height of the Cold War, built upon
the foundations of political participatory rights established in the Universal Declaration.6 Article 25 states:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of
the electors;
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service
61
in his country.
Article 25(b) explicitly obligates states to hold free and fair elections. However, because of the variety of political and ideological
systems that the signatory and drafting states represented at the drafting
of both the ICCPR, and its main influence, the Universal Declaration,
the right is broadly stated. Henry Steiner observes:
The "elections" clause of Article 25 holds forth the promise of
extensive popular participation in an open political process. The
quality of that participation is strongly affected by the ways in
which elections are institutionalized. Nonetheless, human rights
law offers no guidelines for the selection of an electoral system
no theory of
in a given political and socio-economic context,
70
.
.
.
access
or
broad or fair electoral participation
The HRC's General Comment No. 25 (Comment No. 25), published
in 1996, provides a framework-albeit nonbinding-for interpreting the

See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 132d plen. mtg., supra note 45, at 454, 456.
66.
Despite the considerable debate regarding the wording of Article 21 of the Univer67.
sal Declaration, there was little debate in the drafting of Article 25. See Steiner, supra note 7,
at 92 (noting also that the only significant debate surrounded whether to substitute "honest"
for "genuine" in subsection (b)). For a more detailed discussion of the travaux prdparatoires
of Article 25, see generally id.
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 25. This is not a nonderrogable right. See id. art. 5(1).
68.
Elizabeth F. DeFeis, Elections-A Global Right?, 19 Wis. J. INT'L L. 321, 324
69.
(2001).
Steiner, supra note 7, at 108.
70.
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rights expounded in Article 25.' Comment No. 25 states that (1) Article
25 provides an individual right that can give rise to claims;7 2 (2) that restrictions on participation must be "reasonable" ;73 (3) that conditions
must be "based on objective and reasonable criteria";74(4) that Article
25(b) applies to legislative, executive, and referendum polls;75 and (5)
that there must be a free choice of candidates. 76 The "objective and reasonable" language also appears in the ECtHR's jurisprudence, which
relies heavily on Comment No. 25 to ascertain the principles underlying
the right to free legislative elections guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol
I.77 The focus of the HRC, as expressed through Comment No. 25, is
largely on preventing intimidation and enabling citizens to cast their
votes or to run for office without unreasonable restrictions. The communications that the HRC has considered also reflect these front-end
aspects of the right. 79 For example, in Debreczeny v. Netherlands, the
HRC stated: "The Committee notes that the right provided for by article

71.
That framework, however, is not the only interpretation of the minimum criteria for
free and fair elections. Compare Wheatley, supra note 8, at 238 (listing "regular elections,
which are free and fair, with universal and equal suffrage, open to multiple parties, conducted
by secret ballot, monitored by independent electoral authorities, and free of fraud and intimidation"), with Fox, supra note 7, at 552 ("[E]lections must be by universal and equal suffrage,
by secret ballot, at reasonable, periodic intervals, and may not evidence discrimination against
voters or candidates."), and Wippman, supra note 10, at 667 n.4 1.
72.
General Comment No. 25, supra note 33, 2.
73.
Id. 1 10. Deprivations of the right must also be "objective and reasonable." Id. 14.
74.
Id. 4.
75.
76.

Id. 6.
Id. 15.

77.
Conte, supra note 45, at 71; Fox, supra note 7, at 560-61. For examples of reliance
on HRC jurisprudence and General Comment No. 25 by regional courts, see Melnychenko v.
Ukraine, App. No. 17707/02, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 784, 790 (2006); Hirst v. United Kingdom
(No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 198; Mexican Election Decisions, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 1/90, OEA/Ser.L/VIII.77, doc. 7 rev. 1 39 (1989-1990).
78.
See, e.g., General Comment No. 25, supra note 33, i 11, 15. While no particular
electoral system is required or recommended, the HRC does endorse the one person, one vote
principle. Id. 21; Human Rights Comm., Mdtyus v. Slovakia, Comm. No. 923/2000, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/923/2000 (July 22, 2002) (regarding drawing of electoral boundaries).
79.
See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., ) Colchdin v. Ireland, Comm. No. 1038/2001,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/1038/2001 (Apr. 17, 2003) (right of citizens abroad to vote); Human
Rights Comm., Debreczeny v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 500/1992, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/53/D/500/1992 (Apr. 4, 1995) (right of city civil servants to run for city council);
Human Rights Comm., Bwalya v. Zambia, Comm. No. 314/1988, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Vol. I),
at 52-56 (July 14, 1993) (right to run for office); Human Rights Comm., Marshall v. Canada,
Comm. No. 205/1986, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/43/D/205/1986 (Dec. 3, 1991) (no right of indigenous group to participate in constitutional convention); Human Rights Comm., Zapala v.
Uruguay, Comm. No. 44/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/44/1979 (Apr. 9, 1981) (right to vote
of a former member of the Communist Party).
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25 is not an absolute right and that restrictions of this right are allowed
80
as long as they are not discriminatory or unreasonable.,,
Back-end electoral rights are inherent in the right to vote (if the vote
does not count, the right is infringed), the right to run for office (if the
declared winner does not reflect the will of the voters, the right to run
has been infringed), and the underlying principle that the will of the
people" determines the authority of the government.8 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has stated, for example, that "[t]he act
of electing representatives must be 'authentic' in the sense stipulated by
the American Convention, implying that there must be some consistency
between the will of the voters and the result of the election."" Accordingly, Gregory Fox has suggested that "genuine," in the U.N.-treaty
context at least, means that the election "guarantees the will of the electors.*"4 The ECtHR also established this principle as underlying the right
to free elections in its first case addressing an alleged violation of Article
3, right-to-free-and-fair-elections case: "Article 3 ... provides only for
'free' elections 'at reasonable intervals,' 'by secret ballot' and 'under
conditions that will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people.' "8 However, Comment No. 25 provides little guidance on how to
ensure such an end result. It states that "results of genuine elections
6
should be respected and implemented" and that "[t]here should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to
judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confi8
dence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes." The
HRC, however, has not directly addressed vote counting beyond that ob.88
servation.

80.

Human Rights Comm., Debreczeny v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 500/1992,

19.2,

U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/53/D/500/1992 (Apr. 4, 1995); see also Mexican Election Decisions,

Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 1/90, OEA/Ser.L/VIII.77, doc. 7 rev. 1174 (1989-1990)
(discussing intimidation of voters as a "situation[] the effect of which is to modify the basic
conditions of equality under which elections must be held").
Note that unlike other rights in the ICCPR, Article 25 rights inhere in "citizens"
81.
only. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 25. Only Article 13, which applies to aliens, also limits the
individuals who hold the right. Id. art. 13.
See, e.g., Conte, supra note 45, at 71.
82.
Mexican Election Decisions, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 1/90,
83.
OEA/Ser.L/VIII.77, doc. 7 rev. I 47 (1989-1990).
Fox, supra note 7, at 558.
84.
Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert v. Belgium, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1987)
85.
(citing to the traveaux prdparatoiresof the ECHR) (emphasis added).
General Comment No. 25, supra note 33, 19.
86.
87.

Id. $ 20.

The only opinion that the HRC handed down regarding voting conduct addressed
88.
the fairness of automated vote counting. The HRC found the case to be inadmissible, although
it did state that the ICCPR did not proscribe or prescribe any specific voting system. See
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THE EMERGENCE OF BACK-END ELECTORAL RIGHTS IN THE
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

A. The Origins of Electoral Rights in the ECHR

It is not surprising that the European human rights system has made
greater and more rapid progress in defining the scope and implementation of the right to political participation than other regional and
international human rights systems. Although a consensus on the inclusion of a right to political participation was impossible as of the signing
of the European Convention in 1950,9 the right to political participation
and "free" elections was enshrined soon thereafter in the first protocol to
the Convention in 1952.9' Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Article 3) states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature. 92
The ECtHR has since repeatedly emphasized that the provision's location in the first protocol and its lack of textual reference to an individual
right9 does not diminish its fundamental nature: "It was considered that
the unique phrasing [of Article 3] was intended to give greater solemnity
to the Contracting States' commitment and to emphasise that this was an
area where they were required to take positive measures as opposed to
merely refraining from interference."9 Most importantly, the Court
Human Rights Comm., de Clippele v. Belgium, Comm. No. 1082/2002, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/77/D/1082/2002 (Mar. 28, 2003); see also Conte, supra note 45, at 73.
89.
See Wippman, supra note 10, at 666.
90.
DAvis, supra note 42, at 243-44 (noting that the provision on voting was one of the
most difficult on which to muster agreement and that the United Kingdom, in particular, did
not want to have "overly prescriptive approach to what was required by a political system and
needed a form of words which would recognize the different systems in Europe"); Steiner,
supra note 7, at 95.
91.
See Protocol No. 1,supra note 1, art. 3.
92.
93.

Id.
By beginning with "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake

...

,"

the ECHR

placed the obligation with the ECHR Contracting Parties, as opposed to placing the locus of
the right with the individual citizen. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 1; cf id. art. 3 ("No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." (emphasis added));
id. art. 5 ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law
. ."(emphasis added)).
94.
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 209; see also Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert v. Belgium, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 22 (1987) ("Since it
enshrines a characteristic principle of democracy, Article 3 of Protocol No. I is accordingly of
prime importance in the Convention system."). Commentators have noted that the provision
should have been in Section I of the Convention, "as a further elaboration of the concept of
'effective political democracy' in the Preamble and of 'democratic society' in various provi-
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found that an individual right existed, thereby allowing both individuals
and states to bring claims of violations of Article 3.9' Had the Court adhered to a stricter textual reading, claims would be limited to those by
states against other states," which would have virtually eviscerated the
right due to a lack of political will and the difficulties in identifying violations and appropriate remedies.
Several factors explain why the Court has interpreted Article 3 so
liberally. First, the right to free and fair elections guaranteed by Article 3
is narrower than the overarching right to political participation established by ICCPR Article 25.97 The limited nature of Article 3 has cabined
the number and kind of claims that the ECtHR may hear and, therefore,
likewise has constrained the intrusion into sovereign domestic affairs.
For example, Article 3 protects only the free and fair elections of "the
legislature," foreclosing claims concerning the elections of presidential
candidates and other executive officers and referenda. 98 In the official
French language, "legislature" is "corps lIgislatif," which the Court has
interpreted to encompass only "the election of a body vested with legislative power and that the constitutional law of the contracting state in
question is decisive in this respect."99 Originally, this limited jurisdiction
had less of an impact given the largely parliamentary European political
systems. However, the accession of many post-Communist Eastern
European states to the European Convention has brought many powerful
presidencies within the ECtHR's jurisdiction. The popular "revolutions"
resulting from contested presidential elections in the region-the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in
2003, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004-therefore have so
far remained outside of the purview of Article 3.1
DUK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs 478 (2d ed. 1990).

sions of the Convention." P. VAN

Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 22.
95.
See ECHR, supra note 1, art. 1; Fox, supra note 7, at 562.
96.
For example, Article 3 applies only to "legislatures," which the ECtHR has inter97.
preted loosely, though not loosely enough (yet) to include the elections of executives or heads
of state. See, e.g., Bolkoski v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2004-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 379, 387-88 (decision on admissibility); Guliyev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 35584/02, 1 5
(Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2004), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=
hudoc-en (search using application number) (decision on admissibility) (finding that the president of Azerbaijan is the head of the executive and "is vested with few powers that could be
construed, to some very limited extent, as being related to the legislative power" in part because he cannot issue decrees that have the force of law that supersede a parliamentary act);
see also DAVIs, supra note 42, at 243; LEACH, supra note 3, at 366.
See Guliyev, App. No. 35584/02,1 5.
98.
VAN DUK & VAN HooF, supra note 94, at 485-86; see Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert,
99.
113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 21.
Although the Court has not entirely precluded any review of presidential elections,
100.
it has not yet found a claim pertaining to a presidential election to be admissible. See
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A second limitation on the scope of Article 3 derives from the homogeneity of the signatory states. All member states of the Council of
Europe-and, hence, states party to the European Convention-must
have democratic systems of government.'o' This democratic requirement
has facilitated the acceptance of the right to free and fair elections as a
legal obligation. Furthermore, the membership of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Union (either as member states or as
.103
applicants) is increasingly coextensive. These three bodies have repeatedly confirmed commitments both to democracy and to free and fair
elections. '0

The narrow scope of Article 3 also has had a positive effect on the
development and enforcement of electoral rights in Europe. That the
right to political participation enshrined in Article 3 is limited to "free
elections" and does not contain a nebulous political participation provision, such as ICCPR Article 25(a) or Universal Declaration Article
21(1), concentrates the right and its interpretation'os and removes some
of the fears of intrusive manipulation of domestic governance systems.
Elections are far more contained-and periodic-events than general
ongoing access to governance and the political sphere.
Bolkoski, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 387-88; see also Guliyev, App. No. 35584/02,
Bolkoski, the Court stated:

15. In

The Court does not exclude ... the possibility of applying Article 3 . . . to presidential elections.... Should it be established that the office of head of State had been
vested with the power to initiate and adopt legislation, or that it enjoyed wide powers over the passage of legislation or the power of censure over the principal
legislation-setting bodies, then it could arguably be construed as the "legislature"
within the meaning of Article 3 ....
Bolkoski, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 387-88.
101.
Protocol No. 1, supra note 1, art. 3; ECHR, supra note 1, pmbl.; Statute of the
Council of Europe, pmbl., art. 3, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103.
102.
Steiner, supra note 7, at 95.
103.
See Wheatley, supra note 8, at 225 (finding that while there is not yet a international
norm obligating all states to maintain democratic governance, "such an obligation exists in
Europe").
104.
United Communist Party of Turkey & Others v.Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 2122 ("Democracy is without a doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order ....
[The Court] has pointed out several times that the Convention was designed to maintain and
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society."). The ECtHR noted that Article 3 "presupposes the existence of a representative legislature, elected at reasonable intervals, as the
basis of a democratic society." The Greek Case, App. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67,
3344/67, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 179 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). For commitment to
free elections, election monitoring, and democracy in the OSCE, see Charter of Paris for a
New Europe pmbl., § G.1, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 193; Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE §§ I(5)-(8), June 29, 1990, 29
I.L.M. 1305 [hereinafter Copenhagen Document]. The Copenhagen Document urges signatory
states to accede to the ECHR and the ICCPR. Id. § 1(5.21).
105.
See DAVis, supra note 42, at 243.
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Nevertheless, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 to be largely coextensive with ICCPR Article 25 by looking to the common democratic
heritage of the European Convention's Contracting Parties 0 In doing
so, the Court has stated that "Article 3 provides only for 'free' elections
which
'at reasonable intervals,' 'by secret ballot' and 'under conditions
07
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people."",1
The evolution of Article 3 rights, however, continues to be affected
by the traditional impediments to the development and enforceability of
such rights discussed in Part I of this Note. Sovereignty concerns, which
have impeded the development of the right to political participation since
that right's inception, continue to restrain the Court's broader interpretations of Article 3. In particular, the very wide margin of appreciation
extended to the right to free and fair elections in the ECtHR jurisprudence is evidence of the need to accept and permit a wide diversity of
national systems as they have organically emerged throughout history.'o
The Court has reiterated that it must grant states a greater margin of appreciation'" when considering Article 3 cases than it does when
considering some other European Convention rights."o The collective
nature of the right-reflected in the text of Article 3-reinforces this
limitation. Thus, the Court has noted that the rights inferred from Article
3 are not absolute. Instead, there are "implied limitations" based on a
state's history, political evolution, and national interests."
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 210 (finding universal
106.
suffrage guaranteed by Article 3); Podkolzina v. Latvia, 2002-H Eur. Ct. H.R. 443, 458 (finding a right to stand for election guaranteed by Article 3); Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert v.
Belgium, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 23 (1987); see Fox, supra note 7, at 560-61.
107.
Bompard v. France, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 337, 347 (decision on admissibility)
(quoting Protocol No. 1, supra note 1, art. 3).
See, e.g., Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep.
108.
288, 318 (2008) ("[T]here can be a diversity of possible choices in the system of voter registration amongst the contracting states. None of these criteria should, however, be considered
more valid than any other, provided that the expression of the will of the people though free,
fair and regular elections is guaranteed.").
As used by the ECtHR, the margin-of-error doctrine is one of deference to national
109.
governments' interpretations of the ECHR and their own laws and actions: "The margin of
appreciation doctrine, most renowned for its application in the case law of the [ECtHR], establishes a methodology for scrutiny by international courts of the decisions of national
authorities-i.e., national governments, national courts and other national actors." Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J.

L. 907, 909 (2005). It has "two principal elements ... : (i) Judicial deferenceinternational courts should grant national authorities a certain degree of deference and respect
their discretion on the manner of executing their international law obligations .. .. [and] (ii)
Normative flexibility-international norms subject to the doctrine have been characterized as
open-ended or unsettled." Id. at 909-10 (footnotes omitted).
110.
See Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 272.
Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 23; see also MelnyIll.
chenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 17707/02, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 784, 800 (2006).
INT'L
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Although the margin of appreciation is wide in Article 3 cases, "the
State's margin of appreciation in this regard is limited by the obligation
to respect the fundamental principle of Article 3, namely 'the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.""' 2
In Mathieu-Mohin and Cleyfert v. Belgium, the first case in which the

Court addressed an alleged violation of Article 3, the Court articulated
the legal standard applicable to Article 3 claims:
[States] have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it
is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to
satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive
them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a
legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate ....

In particular, such conditions must not thwart the

free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature."3

The emphasis on equality and non-discrimination in this early
ECtHR jurisprudence reflects the early focus on those principles in the
Universal Declaration and the ICCPR. The Court has since adapted and
applied this test of whether the conditions of or restrictions to the right
are in pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim within the
limits of "the free expression of the opinion of the people" to a variety of
aspects of the right to vote and to run for office. 114
Within the scope of the Mathieu-Mohinand Cleyfert test, states have
broad discretion to develop their own forms of democratic and electoral
systems."' The Court underscored this principle in Podkolzina v. Latvia,
in which the Court found a violation of Article 3 when Latvia required a
candidate from the Russian-speaking minority to take additional language examinations despite presenting a valid language certificate.
The Court stated:
112.
Melnychenko, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 800 (citing Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert v. Belgium, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1987), and Podkolzina v. Latvia, 2002-fl Eur. Ct.
H.R. 443, 458-59); see also Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 210
(noting that electoral procedures and restrictions "must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying
the will of the people through universal suffrage").
113.
Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 23 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also id. at 22; Melnychenko, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 800.
114.
See Hirst,2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 212.
115.
Mathieu-Mohin & Cleyfert, 113 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 24; see also Bompard v.
France, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 337, 347 (decision on admissibility).
116.
Podkolzina, 2002-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 445-47.
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Although [States' constitutional rules regarding eligibility of
candidates] have a common origin in the need to ensure both the
independence of elected representatives and the freedom of electors, these criteria vary in accordance with the historical and
political factors specific to each State; the multiplicity of situations provided for in the constitutions and electoral legislation of
numerous member States ... shows the diversity of possible ap-

proaches in this area. For the purposes of applying Article 3, any
electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political
evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would
be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in
the context of another. 17
The "political evolution" can also take into account the relative stability of the political situation, as was evident in the Court's application
of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the context of the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003."' In Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, the
Court found that there was no violation of Article 3 when a change in
voter registration that took place between a cancelled parliamentary election and the rescheduled election "proved not to be the cause of the
problem of ballot fraud but a reasonable attempt to remedy it, whilst not
providing a perfect solution."" 9
B. The ECtHR and Back-End Electoral Rights
The ECtHR initially addressed many of the same front-end participatory rights that the HRC has ruled on, such as restrictions on eligibility
to cast a vote or to run for office.120 Because of the aforementioned traditional impediments to enforcement of electoral rights, the Court's
early Article 3 jurisprudence focused mainly on equality and
117.
118.
(2008).
119.

Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288, 317
Id.

92.

See, e.g., Campagnano v. Italy, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 197, 211 (eligibility of bank120.
rupt individual to vote); Shukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, App. No. 13716/02, 173 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.aspskin=hudoc-en
(search using application number) (electoral deposit requirement); Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 273 (right of Gibraltar residents to vote in European
Parliament elections); Sadak & Others v. Turkey (No. 2), 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 304;
Melnychenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 17707/02, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 784, 801 (2002) (residency
restrictions on eligibility to run for office); Podkolzina, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 461 (restrictions on eligibility to run for parliament as applied); TV Vest & Rogaland Pensjonisparti v.
Norway, App. No. 21132/05, 1 69-71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number)
(ability to advertise campaign); cf supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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anti-discrimination.12' After having few opportunities to interpret Article
3, the Court has recently been confronted with challenges to what this
Note identifies as back-end electoral rights.122 Once the former Communist regimes in Eastern Europe began acceding to the ECHR in the early
1990s and began holding the first elections that could result in a turnover
of government in the mid-1990s, the Court saw a surge of claims of Article 3 violations. These claims included, for the first time, alleged
violations of back-end electoral rights such as fraudulent vote-counting
and biased governmental oversight and certification of results. Cases
arising from these contested elections in the late 1990s and early
2000s-including the various color revolutions--did not wend their way
through the complex judicial bureaucracy of the ECtHR until very recently. Consequently, it was only in 2008, in Kovach v. Ukraine and
Georgian LabourParty,that the Court found claims relating to back-end
electoral rights even to be admissible.12 In two earlier admissibility decisions, LZ. v. Greece (1994) and Babenko v. Ukraine (1999), the Court
had found claims involving alleged violations of back-end electoral
rights inadmissible, holding that local courts' rejections of such alleged
violations were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.124 Despite dismissing
the back-end claims in LZ. and Babenko, the Court's decisions in those
121.
See, e.g., Bompard v. France, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 337, 348 (decision on admissibility) ("[T]he phrase 'conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the
people in the choice of the legislature' implies essentially-apart from freedom of expression
(already protected under Article 10 of the Convention)-the principle of equality of treatment
of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right to stand for election."). Podkolzina, which considers language requirements for legislative candidates, is a particularly
good example of this jurisprudence. [Podkolzina], 2002-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 445-47; see also
Sejdid & Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. Nos. 27996/06, 34836/06,
38-50 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Dec. 22, 2009), availableat http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search using application number) (finding a violation of Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in application of ECHR rights, in conjunction with Article 3 when the government
provided no recourse for citizens of Roma and Jewish ethnicities who were barred from running for the House of Peoples because they were not Bosnian, Serbian, or Croatian).
122.
See Georgian LabourParty, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 315-16; Kovach v. Ukraine, App.
No. 39424/02,
51, 55, 61 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number); cf Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 1999), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number)
(decision on admissibility); I.Z. v. Greece, App. No. 18997/91, 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 65, 68 (1994) (decision on admissibility).
123.
Georgian Labour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 315; Kovach, App. No. 39424/02,
(N 40-44.
124.
Babenko, App. No. 43476/98 (finding that the applicant presented insufficient evidence to show that the electoral commission's actions had affected the outcome of the
election); I.Z, 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 68 (finding a "mere theoretical possibility" that the non-provision of write-in ballots in one town could change the outcome of the
election to be insufficient when more than ninety percent of the electorate would have had to
vote for one of three independent, write-in candidates).
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cases left the door open for such claims when more egregious allegations
arose in Kovach and Georgian Labour Party, in which significant porthrough vote
tions of the electorate were "de facto disenfranchise[ed]"
annulment.
1. Finding Back-End Electoral Claims Admissible Under Article 3

I.Z. was the first case in which the Court determined that an individual voter has standing to raise an Article 3 claim. The applicant-voter in
LZ. claimed a violation of Article 3 when local election officials did not
distribute blank write-in ballots to voters, thereby preventing them from
voting for the three independent candidates who had not submitted preprinted ballots.126 The European Commission on Human Rights, the
predecessor of the ECtHR, first found that a single voter can have standing to challenge electoral results under Article 3 when "the applicant was
directly and personally affected by the alleged irregularity in the exercise
of his right to vote." 27 The Commission went on to hold that because the
national courts had addressed the applicant's claim on the merits, "the
Commission's review must be confined to whether or not such a finding
was arbitrary."12 The Commission found the national court's review not
to be arbitrary because the actual prejudice to the voters "appears to be
based on a mere theoretical possibility" given that 21,006 voters in a
24,000-voter district would have had to use the blank ballots to write in
the same independent candidate's name in order for actual prejudice to
have resulted.129 Therefore, the applicant's claim in LZ., although unsuccessful, facilitated an important step toward recognizing back-end
electoral rights because the Court determined that a single voter or candidate can challenge the irregularities that affected voting throughout the
jurisdiction. "0
Five years later, in Babenko, the Court further opened the door to
the enforcement of back-end electoral rights by acknowledging that
claims challenging the neutrality of the electoral commissions in
charge of tabulating and announcing official results could be admissible. 'I Babenko sought an annulment of electoral results, claiming that
125.
39424/02,

Georgian Labour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 329; see also Kovach, App. No.
61.

126.

LZ., 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 66-67.

127.

Id. at 67.

128.

Id. at 68.

129.

Id. at 68-69.

130.

Georgian Labour Party later expanded this principle of standing to political parties

running in a party list system. GeorgianLabour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 313-14.

131.
See Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98, at 4 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 1999),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number) (decision on admissibility).
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various irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots violated his
Article 3 right to stand for office in free and fair elections. 32 The ECtHR
stated that it was not its place to determine whether irregularities affected internal rights, but rather whether there was interference with the
people's choice of legislative body in violation of Article 3.13 The Court
found the case inadmissible in part because the difference in votes between Babenko and his principal opponent was so great that the
irregularities were unlikely to have compromised the will of the peo134
ple. Moreover, Babenko had an opportunity to bring his claim to the
local courts, which the ECtHR determined had not ruled arbitrarily in
finding against him.13 Since LZ. and Babenko, the Court has heard several claims addressing back-end electoral rights but has yet to find
sufficient evidence of improper electoral commission influence to find a
violation of Article 3 on that ground and has avoided even reaching the
issue of commission neutrality when violations were apparent in other
official actions.136 The Court, however, has not been shy about criticizing
the questionable actions of election commissions.13
2. Tentatively Finding the First Violations of
Back-End Electoral Rights
More than a decade after LZ., the Court found its first violations of
Article 3 based on the infringement of back-end electoral rights in Ko38
vach and Georgian Labour Party.1
The two decisions were decided just
five months apart in 2008, and both arose in the context of post132.

Id. at 1-2.

133.

Id. at 3 ("La Cour n'est pas tenue de ddcider s'il s'est produit effectivement une

irrigularitiau regarddu droit interne. Elle doitplut6tditenniner s'ily a eu ingdrence dans la
libre expression de l'opinion du peuple sur le choix du corps ldgislatif contrairement t

l'article3.").
134.
Id. at 4.
135.
Id.
136.
See also Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep.
288, 321 (2008); Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02, 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number). In Kovach, however, the Court did find that a commission decision to annul
the results from four polling stations was arbitrary and not proportionate to any legitimate aim.
Kovach, App. No. 39424/02, 62.
137.
Babenko, App. No. 43476/98, at 4 (noting that the ballot was not entirely secret:
"bien que le caract~re secret du scrutin n'eat pas dtd compl&tement assurd"); Georgian Labour Party,48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 320-21 (recognizing that commissioners appointed by parties
may not be neutral); Kovach, App. No. 39424/02, 52 ("The Court has doubts as to whether a
practice discounting all votes at a polling station at which irregularities have taken place, regardless of the extent of the irregularity and regardless of the impact on the outcome of the
result in the constituency, can at all be seen as pursuing a legitimate aim for the purposes of
Article 3 ... .").
138.
See GeorgianLabour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 329; Kovach, App. No. 39424/02,
61.
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Communist elections: the Ukrainian parliamentary election of 2002 and
the Georgian repeat parliamentary election of 2004 during the Rose
Revolution. The decisions also came after a spate of "revolutions" in
post-Communist Europe that specifically challenged state officials' actions
on the back end of the electoral processes.'"9 These cases involved challenges to the annulment of polling station results in Kovach'4 and to the
failure to hold scheduled repeat elections in Georgian Labour Party.141
The Court found a violation of back-end electoral rights under Article 3 for the first time in Kovach. 14 Kovach was a candidate for
parliament in an electoral district in Zakarpatska oblast, Ukraine, in
2002.143 A local Hungarian-language newspaper endorsed another candidate in that district, and both the secretary and chairperson of the
district's electoral commission signed the endorsement. The electoral
commission subsequently canceled the results in four of the polling stations, in which Kovach obtained 2,488 votes and the endorsed opponent
1,269 votes, due to allegations of fraud. 14 After Kovach unsuccessfully
appealed the cancellation of these results to the district's electoral commission, the commission certified the results tabulated from the
remaining polling stations in the district and accorded 32,225 votes to
Disputed election results triggered popular movements, known collectively as the
139.
color revolutions, in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and the Kyrgyz Republic
(2005). See generally Joshua A. Tucker, Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 535 (2007). Unsuccessful

popular protests of disputed elections took place in Azerbaijan (2005), Belarus (2006), and
Moldova (2009). See Rufat Abbasov & Mina Muradova, Police Squash Election Sit-Down
(Nov. 28, 2005), http://www.eurasianet.orglazerbaijan/news/
Protest, EURASIANET
police_20051128.html; Margot Letain, The 'Denim Revolution': A Glass Half Full, OPEN-

DEMOCRACY (Apr. 10, 2006), http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions
government/denim_-3441.jsp; Moldova's "Twitter Revolution," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Moldovas -TwitterRevolution/
1605005.html; Andrew Wilson, Europe's Next Revolution?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009,
(comparing Moldova's
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/opinion/09iht-edwilson.html
2009 protests with Ukraine's Orange Revolution).
Kovach, App. No. 39424/02, 39 (considering Kovach's claim that the annulment
140.
of the results of four polling stations "had not ensured the free expression of the opinion of the
people in the choice of the legislature").
Georgian Labour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 329 (addressing the Georgian Labour
141.
Party's claim that the authorities' failure to hold repeat elections in two cities resulted in the
"de facto disenfranchisement" of 60,000 voters). Although Georgian Labour Party could be
seen as a front-end rights decision because the focus of the case was the disenfranchisement of
a number of voters, Georgian Labour Party is in essence a back-end rights case because the
challenge was to the electoral commission's certification of election results without the participation of those voters. The front-end nature of the case, however, may have facilitated the
ECtHR's resolution of the case in favor of the applicant.
Kovach, App. No. 39424/02, 1 61.
142.
143.

Id. 4.

144.
145.

Id. in 5-7.
Id. (H9-10.
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the opponent and 31,079 to Kovach.146 The national Central Election
Commission (CEC) directed the district election commission to give reasons for their cancellation after the canceled polling stations protested
and claimed that no fraud had taken place.147 The district commission
affirmed its earlier decision, basing its decision on Section 72 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, which permitted cancellation if there were
"other circumstances making it impossible to establish the results of the
expression of the electorate's wishes."148 The CEC and Ukraine's Supreme Court affirmed the district election commission's decision and

certified the results.149
Because the alleged violation-the annulment of polling station results-focused solely on the state authority's oversight of the results of
the election, the case exclusively addressed back-end electoral rights:
"The present case concerns not eligibility conditions as such, but the
way in which the outcome of elections was reviewed by the responsible
domestic authorities." 0 Moreover, unlike in I.Z. and Babenko, in which
the reversal of a cancellation of votes would not have affected the outcome of the election,' the Court could not find the case inadmissible on
the ground that the state authorities' decision was non-prejudicial.' 52 The
Court was therefore forced to address Kovach's claim of a violation of
back-end electoral rights on the merits.
The Court in Kovach first addressed the potential discrimination and
inequality caused by the alleged violation.' The Court noted that no
electoral system can completely prevent "wasted votes," because not all
votes must have identical weight and not all candidates need have "equal
chances of victory." 5 4 The Court warned, however, that "[a]ny departure
from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature . . . . Exclusion of any groups or

categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11.
12-13.
14.

116-17.
55.

151.
See Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 1999), available
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number) (decision on admissibility); I.Z. v. Greece, App. No. 18997/91, 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 65, 66-67 (1994) (decision on admissibility).
152.
Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02, T 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2008), available
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number).
153.
154.

Id. 50.
Id. 49.
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with the underlying purposes of Article 3 . .. .""' The Court expressed

considerable "doubt[]" about whether disenfranchising so many voters
because of allegations of fraud by a few was consistent with these principles. The district election commission had denied Kovach's claim
because "other circumstances" rendered a determination of the people's
will impossible.5 7 The Court ultimately determined that dismissing the
claim with this laconic and nebulous reasoning, and without addressing
the credibility of the allegations of fraud or how that fraud rendered a
determination of the people's will impossible, was "arbitrary, and not
58
proportionate to any legitimate [government] aim." Kovach thus became the first violation of Article 3, back-end electoral rights and opened
the door to similar claims involving alleged official fraud related to vote
tabulation.
In Georgian Labour Party, the ECtHR expanded on this element of
the right by recognizing the unique and vital role that an unbiased election commission plays in guaranteeing back-end electoral rights. The
Court warned: "Ultimately, the raison d'etre of an electoral commission
is to ensure the effective administration of free and fair polls in an impartial manner, which, in the Court's opinion, would be impossible to
achieve if that commission becomes another forum for political struggle
between election candidates."5 9 The Georgian Labour Party alleged that
the Georgian government violated Article 3 by failing to properly maintain the electoral rolls, appointing non-neutral electoral commissions,
and "the de facto disenfranchisement of a significant section of the population" during the repeat parliamentary elections in 2004. '6 Following
the election, the Central Election Commission (CEC) annulled the results of all polling stations in two districts in the Ajarian Autonomous
Id. That the Court chose to first highlight these aspects of the violation, despite the
155.
fact that the resolution of the case rested entirely on whether the state authorities reviewing
Kovach's claim decided against him arbitrarily, belies the continued importance of the traditional principles of equality and anti-discrimination from which the right to political
participation evolved.
156.
157.
158.

Id. 152.
Id. T 57.
Id.161.

Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288, 318
159.
(2008).
Id. at 290. The Supreme Court of Georgia annulled the results of the November
160.
2003 parliamentary election following the events of the Rose Revolution and two days after
President Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from office. Id. at 291-92. Elections were rescheduled for March 2004. Id. at 292. The Central Election Commission, composed largely of
recent appointees of interim President Nino Burjanadze and a new chairperson elected by
parliament following Burjanadze's recommendation, established the regulations governing the
repeat election. Id. at 292-93. President Saakashvili, who took office in January 2004, appointed five members of the fifteen-member Central Election Commission that ultimately
oversaw the election. Id. at 293.
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Republic.1' The CEC gave no specific grounds for annulment but scheduled a repeat election in those districts. The polls, however, failed to
open on the day of the scheduled re-run.162 Nevertheless, on the same
day, the CEC tabulated the national results of the repeat election without
any votes from those two districts. According to these results, the Georgian Labour Party failed to cross the seven-percent threshold in the
proportional representation system. 16 The results were certified, and the
government blamed the failure of the polls to open on the Ajarian government.'6 The Georgian Labour Party petitioned the Supreme Court of
Georgia for an injunction preventing the president from convening the
new parliament until the courts addressed its claim for annulment of the
results. 1 The Supreme Court denied the injunction and the Georgian
Labour Party's claim, again blaming tensions in the Ajarian region.166
In finding its second violation of back-end electoral rights, the Court
agreed with the Georgian Labour Party that the exclusion of two electoral districts-constituting 2.5 percent of the state's electorate-from
the election constituted a violation of Article 3.167 As in Kovach, the
Court in Georgian Labour Party first noted that the annulment of votes
undermines the principle of universal suffrage and, therefore, challenges
the legitimacy of the resulting legislature and any acts it may promul168
gate. However, unlike in L.. and Babenko, in which the ECtHR denied
admissibility because any prejudice to the applicant-candidates was too
theoretical, the Court held that the Georgian Labour Party "was entitled
under [Article 3] to rely on the electorate of Khulo and Kobuleti, irrespective of its chances to obtain a majority of their votes" as would be

necessary for the repeat election to have affected the outcome of the
election in the Georgian Labour Party's favor. 169Thus, the Court recognized, for the first time, that an Article 3 violation is possible even when
the alleged violative actions only theoretically could have prejudiced the
applicant. Citing the "inexplicable [haste]," the lack of detailed reason161.
Id. at 294.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. (noting that the Georgian Labour Party received only 6.01 percent of the vote).
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 295.
166.
Id. at 296.
167.
Id. at 323, 329.
168.
Id. at 323-24; cf Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02, 50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7,
2008), availableat http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number).
169.
Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288, 324
(2008) (emphasis added); cf Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4,
1999), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number) (decision on admissibility); I.Z. v. Greece, App. No. 18997/91, 76-A Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 65, 68 (1994) (decision on admissibility).
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ing for annulling the original results in Ajarian, and similar reports of
fraud in other districts that did not result in annulment, the Court found
that "[t]he exclusion of those two districts from the general election
process was void of a number of rule of law requisites and resulted in a
0
de facto disenfranchisement of a significant section of the population.""
The Court therefore found a violation of Article 3 by the CEC for failing
to establish and implement safeguards at the back end of the electoral
process that would ensure the exercise of the front-end right to cast a
vote.' 7 ' However, the Court's emphasis on the front-end rights of the two
districts' voters underscored the Court's continued reluctance to rely
solely on a violation of back-end electoral rights.
3. Expanding the ECtHR's Back-End Electoral-Rights Jurisprudence
Although the Court began to address the back-end scope of the Article 3 election right in cases like Kovach and Georgian Labour Party, it
was reluctant to review more blatant fraudulent actions by the authorities, such as vote rigging, and focused instead on the soundness of
72
official decisions and domestic judicial determinations.' This is understandable given the requirements regarding exhaustion of local remedies
under the ECHR,' 73 but it hampers the enforcement and even review of
certain types of fraud that do not emanate from an official decision but
are nonetheless official acts. 174 Thus, the scope of the right, even in the
European system, remains limited: "Once the people can participate in
the composition of the legislature at regular intervals, the requirements
set by Article 3 regarding participation in government have been satisfied." 75 Article 3 "provides only for 'free' elections 'at reasonable
intervals,' 'by secret ballot' and 'under conditions which will ensure the
free expression of the opinion of the people.' Subject to that, it does not
76
create any 'obligation to introduce a specific system.'"
For example, soon after deciding Georgian Labour Party, the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR addressed a challenge to the high ten-percent
Georgian LabourParty,48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 328-29.
170.
See id. at 329.
171.
See generally id.; Kovach, App. No. 39424/02; Babenko, App. No. 43476/98; 1.Z.,
172.
76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 65.
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 35(1) ("The Court may only deal with the matter after all
173.
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken."); see also Human Rights Comm., de Clippele v. Belgium, Comm. No. 1082/2002,
1 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/1082/2002 (Mar. 28, 2003).
For examples of these techniques, see generally ANDREW WILSON, VIRTUAL POLl174.
TICS: FAKING DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-SOVIET WORLD (2005); Roth, supra note 8, at 59-69.
VAN DUK & VAN HooF, supra note 94, at 480.
175.
176.

Bompard v. France, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 337, 347 (decision on admissibility).
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threshold of Turkey's proportional representation system by candidates
from minority parties.17 Although the Grand Chamber, over four rare
dissents, found no violation of Article 3, the decision in Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey is remarkable because of the harshness of its criticism of
the threshold, which, it ventured, "appears excessive."' The Court
stated:
[T]he words "free expression of the opinion of the people" mean
that elections cannot be conducted under any form of pressure in
the choice of one or more candidates, and that in this choice the
elector must not be unduly induced to vote for one party or another. Accordingly no form of compulsion must be brought to
bear on voters as regards their choice of candidates or parties." 9
Consequently, any government limitations on the vote "must not
thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislaturein other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to
maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed
at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage."'so This
emphasis on the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process provides a means of expanding judicial review of back-end electoral rights
because any allegations of fraudulent vote-counting or biased electoral
commissions directly threaten the integrity and effectiveness of the electoral process. 8 '
The Court's willingness to admit and find violations of back-end
electoral rights in Kovach and Georgian Labour Party, and its pointed
critique of national electoral systems in Yumak and Sadak, suggest that
the Court's interpretation of the protective reach of the fundamental
principle of Article 3 is broadening in cases in which there is evidence of
explicit or egregious disenfranchisement. 18 For example, in Kovach, the
177.
Yumak & Sadak v. Turkey, App. No. 10226/03, 74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2008),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number).
178.
Id. 147; see id. (Tulkens, Vajid, Jaeger, and ikuta, JJ., dissenting).
179.
Id. 108 (citation omitted).
180.
Id. I 109(iv) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
181.
See Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288,
323-24 (2008) (emphasizing that the erosion of universal suffrage by annulling votes undermines the legitimacy of the elected parliament); Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02, 50
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=
hudoc-en (search using application number) (same).
182.
See also Paschalidis, Koutmeridis & Zaharakis v. Greece, App. Nos. 27863/05,
28028/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number). In this case, three parliamentary
candidates were elected from Central Macedonia but forced to forfeit their seats after the Supreme Court issued an opinion changing how so-called blank ballots (votes against all parties)
were to be counted. Id. I 11-13. The Court held that applying the new interpretation of the
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Court warned that "[t]he object and purpose of the Convention ... requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to
make their stipulations not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective."' Reliance on OSCE electoral reports also suggests that the real
and perceived validity of the electoral process is within the jurisdiction
of the Court under Article 3.28 While the Court avoided finding violations in the allegations of official fraud in the Georgian and Ukrainian
elections,' it quite openly questioned the authorities' response to the
alleged fraud and its implications for the perceived validity of the electoral results.'8 6 The Court's decisions in Georgian Labour Party and
Kovach thereby opened the door for the Court to address other back-end
electoral rights claims, such as the neutrality of electoral commissions,
the official certification of results, and the management of electoral rolls,
that arise after votes are cast.
The Court opened this door even wider in 2010, when it decided
Grosaru v. Romania and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan.'8 ' In these cases, the Court
moved away from its traditional anti-discrimination and disenfranchisement approach to addressing back-end electoral rights and embraced the
principle, first articulated in the dicta of Yumak and Sadak, that Article 3
directly guarantees the legitimacy and effectiveness of the electoral
process. That is, the Court addressed back-end electoral rights in their
own context and found violations within that new framework.
Grosaru ran for election on a party list made up of a coalition of parties representing the Italian-speaking minority in Romania.' 88 He won the
most votes nationally of any coalition member, but the Central Election
law retroactively did not reflect the will of the voters, who voted against all parties with the
expectation that such a vote would count in a certain way. Id. V[ 32-33.
Kovach, App. No. 39424/02, 1 53.
183.
See Georgian Labour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 306, 308-10, 316. On the other
184.
hand, the Court also deferred to the extreme political situation in Georgia at the time to provide an even larger margin of appreciation in assessing authorities' actions. Id. at 317.
Despite alluding to the broader principles of back-end electoral rights, the Court in
185.
Kovach and Georgian Labour Party ultimately found Article 3 violations under its traditional
equal-suffrage jurisprudence rather than under a broader principle of legitimacy.
186.

Georgian Labour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 323, 329; Kovach, App. No.

39424/02, 'N 56, 62.
Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 18705/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 8, 2010), available at
187.
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number)
(finding a violation of Article 3 when the domestic courts failed to adequately protect the
applicant-candidate's right to run for legislative office and appeal irregularities in the results
and conduct of the election); Grosaru v. Romania, App. No. 78039/01, 1 61 (Eur. Ct. H.R.,
Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search using application number) (finding a violation of Article 3 alone and in conjunction
with Article 13, which guarantees a right to a remedy for violations of the ECHR, when the
applicant was afforded no impartial hearing of his appeal of the Central Election Bureau decision awarding a party list seat to another candidate who received fewer votes).
6-7.
Grosaru,App. No. 78039/01, at
188.
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Bureau (CEB) awarded the seat to another coalition member who had
received the most votes in any single district. ' 9 Grosaru appealed to the
CEB, which denied his claim. A further appeal to the CEB was unsuccessful, and the Constitutional and Supreme courts of Romania declined
to hear Grosaru's claim for lack of jurisdiction over final decisions of the
CEB. In his last attempt for relief, Grosaru appealed to the validations
commission of Romania's Chamber of Deputies.19 The Chamber of
Deputies dismissed the claim on the same grounds as did the CEB.'9 '
In addressing Grosaru's claim, the ECtHR made its strongest statement in support of back-end electoral rights to date:
[The Court] notes that this case does not, as in the vast majority
of cases it has decided thus far in the election context, concern
eligibility conditions, but the certification of a parliamentary
mandate is a matter of law after the election. This is an equally
crucial issue, which also directly affects the outcome of elections, a fact to which the Court attaches great importance.194
The Court further stated that Article 3 protects the right of a successful candidate not to be arbitrarily deprived of an office to which he was
elected, and that to permit such an occurrence would render the right to
free elections "illusory."'95 This language reflects the effect of the Court's
decisions in Kovach and Georgian Labour Party, inter alia, but departs

from the universal-suffrage approach taken in those cases. Instead, it directly addresses back-end electoral rights and the effect of infringement
upon them. The legal standard that the Court applied, consistent with
Kovach and deriving from the earlier front-end-rights case of Podkolzina,
is whether the state authorities' decision was arbitrary or an abuse of
189.
Id. U 8-9.
190.
Id. 10.
191.
Id. V 12-15.
192.
Id. T 16.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. 46 (citing I.Z. v. Greece, App. No. 18997/91, 76-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 65 (1994), and Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 1999),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number)) (author's translation). The original French text of the decision states:
[L]a prdsente affaire ne concerne pas, comme dans la grande majoritg des arr&s
qu'elle a rendus jusqu'd prdsent en matibre dlectorale,des conditions d'lligibiliti,
mais l'attributiond'un mandatde ddputd, soit une question de droit postilectoral.Il
s'agit la d'une probldmatique tout aussi cruciale, qui influe en outre directement
sur le rdsultat des iflections, circonstance a laquelle la Cour accorde une trs
grande importance.
Id.
195.

Id. 147.
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state authority.196 The Court also found, for the first time, that a state
body tasked with reviewing allegations of fraud or improper application
of electoral laws was biased.' 9 However, unlike in prior cases in which
the ECtHR addressed the alleged bias of electoral commissions, the reviewing body in Grosaru was the Chamber of Deputies itself-a
fundamentally political and biased institution whose interests would not
necessarily be consistent with a minority candidate petitioning election
results.!' The nature of the body, and that no domestic judicial body
ruled on Grosaru's claim, again sheltered the ECtHR from taking on the
partiality of an election commission.
While the Court's emphasis on back-end electoral rights in Grosaru
is a notable shift in the Court's Article 3 jurisprudence, what is truly remarkable about this decision is the Court's finding of a violation of
Article 13 of the ECHR. Article 13 states: "Everyone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." 99 Grosaru
claimed a violation of this right, in conjunction with Article 3, because
there was no effective domestic remedy that would allow him to challenge the state authorities' decision not to appoint him to parliament
even though he received the most votes of any member of his coalition.200
Although the Court based its finding of a violation of this right on its
analysis of Grosaru's Article 3 claim without much additional discussion, that the Court found a violation of Article 13 at all is an important
step in broadening the scope of Article 3 with respect to back-end electoral rights by providing another means of remedying any infringement
of those rights.
Building on Grosaru, Kovach, and Georgian Labour Party, the
Court again recognized the existence and peculiarities of non-traditional,
back-end electoral rights in Aliyev.201 In Aliyev, the Court encountered
perhaps the most egregious electoral fraud ever alleged in the ECtHR
under Article 3. Aliyev produced evidence that state authorities were
Id. (citing Podkolzina v.Latvia, 2002-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 443, 460).
196.
Id. 54,57.
197.
Id. 154.
198.
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 13.
199.
Grosaru v. Romania, App. No. 78039/01, 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 2, 2010), avail200.
able at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application
number).
71-75 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 8,
See Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 18705/06,
201.
2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number). The Court stated: "Although originally stated in connection with the
conditions on eligibility to stand for election, the principle requiring prevention of
arbitrariness is equally relevant in other situations where the effectiveness of individual electoral rights is at stake." Id. 72 (citation omitted).
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directly involved in manipulating the electoral process, including coercion of voters by state and municipal officials, harassment of electoral
observers by police, exclusion of residents from voter lists, multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, campaigning, and ballot stuffing by election
202
commissioners, and ballot tampering.
Faced with Aliyev's evidence of fraud and the OSCE's damning report on the November 2005 elections in Azerbaijan,203 the Court was
forced to confront back-end electoral rights directly. In doing so, it expanded on its dicta in GeorgianLabour Party suggesting that a candidate
had a right under Article 3 to "rely on the votes" of all constituents, even
if the likelihood that enough of the disenfranchised voters would have
voted for the candidate was unknown.204 This finding is inconsistent with
the Court's prior admissibility decisions in I.Z. and Babenko, in which
the Court found the applicants' claims inadmissible in part because the
alleged violations, even if true, likely would not have been affected the
outcome of the election.205 The Court seemingly reversed this course in
Aliyev:

[W]hat is at stake in the present case is not the applicant's right
to win the election in his constituency, but his right to stand freely and effectively for it. The applicant was entitled under Article
3 of Protocol No. 1 to stand for election in fair and democratic
conditions, regardless of whether ultimately he won or lost....
Article 3 . . . requires the Court not to ascertain merely that the

election outcome as such was not prejudiced, but to verify that
the applicant's individual right to stand for election was not deprived of its effectiveness and that its essence had not been
206
impaired.
As such, because the Court itself does not ordinarily act as a fact-finding
body with respect to allegations of fraud,207 the Court noted that "the ex202.
See id. 1 9-18.
203.
See id. W 78, 84. The Court reprinted a large section, totaling approximately three
single-spaced pages, of the OSCE's report on the November 2005 elections in Azerbaijan. See
id. 55 (citing ODIHR, OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan ParliamentaryElections 6 November
2005 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, OSCE Doc.

ODIHR.GAL/7/06 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2006/
02/17923_en.pdf).
204.
See Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288,
324 (2008).
205.
Compare id., with Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4,
1999), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number) (decision on admissibility), and I.Z. v. Greece, App. No. 18997/91, 76-A
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 65,68 (1994) (decision on admissibility).
206.
Aliyev, App. No. 18705/06, $ 75 (citation omitted).
207.

Id. $ 77.
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istence of a domestic system for effective examination of individual
complaints and appeals in matters concerning electoral rights is one of
the essential guarantees of free and fair elections." 208
The Court found that no such system existed in Azerbaijan for Aliyev and that the absence of such a system to guarantee back-end
209
electoral rights constitutes a violation of Article 3. Aliyev received no
response to his complaints from the local election commission nor from
the Central Election Commission (CEC), although the local commission
stated that it had reviewed his claim, had received assurances from polling station officials that the results were accurate, and had rejected his
claim as unsubstantiated.210 The Azerbaijani court of appeals, declining
to consider much of the evidence that Aliyev filed with that court, denied
Aliyev's complaint as unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court then denied
the claim on the same grounds, also finding that Aliyev had failed to present evidence that he had exhausted his claim before the CEC.21 1
The ECtHR criticized the election commissions and the courts for
212
failing to address Aliyev's evidence of an arguable claim of fraud. The
Court concluded:
The Court considers that, in order to ensure the State's compliance with its positive obligation under Article 3 . . . to hold free

elections, the domestic courts dealing with the present case, having been called upon to decide on an arguable claim concerning
election irregularities, should have reacted by taking reasonable
steps to investigate the alleged irregularities without imposing
unreasonable and excessively strict procedural barriers on the
213
individual complainant.
The Court reiterated that it was not just the individual's right that was at
stake, "but also, on a more general level, the State's compliance with its
positive duty to hold free and fair elections."2 14 Based on the Azerbaijani
courts' and commission's failure to address Aliyev's claim in any real
way, the Court found that they had dismissed his complaint in an arbitrary manner amounting to a violation of Article 3.2
The Court's strong language in support of ensuring back-end electoral rights in Aliyev and Grosaru reveal the ECtHR's recognition of
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. 181.
91-93.
Id.
Id.
19-21.
See id. 26-27.

212.

Id. (H 83-89.

213.
214.
215.

Id. 88.
Id.
Id. (H 91-93.
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back-end electoral rights and its continued trend toward finding violations of those rights even when discrimination and disenfranchisement is
not the central issue underlying the complaint. Significant gaps remain in
the ECtHR's back-end electoral rights jurisprudence, including problems
enforcing those back-end rights ex ante to prevent the improperly elected
officials from taking office. Instead, any remedial action is merely symbolic compensation. Furthermore, the recent cases addressing back-end
electoral rights have been brought only by candidates and political parties, and not by individual voters. Popular protest of perceived electoral
irregularities, therefore, remains the most readily accessible remedy for
voters frustrated by state officials who manipulate electoral results and
otherwise infringe back-end electoral rights in Europe.216
C. The Lack of an Effective Remedy for Violations of Electoral Rights

A discussion of the damages awarded-or denied-for Article 3 violations also reveals a significant deficiency in the ability of the ECtHR to
enforce Article 3 back-end electoral rights in a meaningful way. Because
an applicant claiming a violation of Article 3 must exhaust domestic legal procedures before the ECtHR can review the claim and because the
ECtHR takes several years to rule on an application, the ECtHR has no
way to change the results of an election that it finds to be fraudulent.
There can be no re-run of the election under such circumstances, and no
way to remove the candidate that state officials improperly certified as
elected. Thus, the ECtHR can only order monetary compensation to the
victim-applicant, which is difficult to quantify and impossible to enforce. Moreover, when candidates, rather than voters, bring suit-as is
often the case-the voters whose rights have been violated receive no
remedy at all other than the satisfaction of a declaratory judgment in the
candidate's favor. Even if a voter-applicant were to win a case before the
ECtHR, it is difficult to anticipate how the ECtHR could remedy that
violation other than providing the just satisfaction of a declaration of a
violation.
The Court's recent Article 3 jurisprudence bears out this limitation.
In Kovach, the candidate-applicant sought pecuniary damages for lost
salary as a member of parliament.217 However, because he could not present all documentation necessary to determine the salary he would have
been entitled to, the Court could not award any such damages.21 The
216.
See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
217.
Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02, | 64-66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number).

218.
Id.; see also Grosaru v. Romania, App. No. 78039/01, 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 2,
2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
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Court did award lost-salary damages to the three applicants in Pashalidis, Koutmeridis, and Zaharakis v. Greece. However, all of these
applicants lost their parliamentary seats after the Supreme Court
changed its interpretation of the electoral laws ex post and redistributed
the seats in the applicants' region.2 1 9 Kovach also claimed C41,715 in
damages for distress, of which the Court awarded C8,000.220 Similarly, in
Georgian Labour Party, the Court denied all requests for damages, finding that the party was not entitled to pecuniary damages for the cost of
running in the repeat election nor for projected salaries of members of
parliament that may-or may not-have been elected if the re-run of the
repeat election had occurred in the two Ajarian districts. 22 1 Moreover,
with respect to the Georgian Labour Party's claim for non-pecuniary
damages for anguish and distress, the Court stated: "[T]he Court considers that the nature of the violation found, namely the arbitrary departure
from the principle of universal suffrage, constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for the breach of the applicant party's right to stand for election
under [Article 3] .222 The Court did, however, order Georgia to pay the
223
party for relevant legal fees, totaling C10,043.
D. Safeguarding Back-End ElectoralRights
Through Election Monitoring
While the ECtHR has begun to review allegations of fraud on the results end of elections, resolution of such allegations is still largely left to
the political process. International election monitoring has provided a
quasi-legal framework within which to address such allegations. This
application number) (declining to award pecuniary damages for lost wages for similar reasons).
219.
Paschalidis, Koutmeridis & Zaharakis v. Greece, App. Nos. 27863/05, 28028/05,
IT 34-35 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 10, 2008), availableat http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.
asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number). The three applicants were awarded
between C78,298 and C142,532 for lost wages. Id. T 39. The three applicants also received
E1,000 each in non-pecuniary damages and between 62,000 and C5,000 each for legal costs.
Id. TT 41, 46.
220.
Kovach, App. No. 39424/02, IN 67-69; see also Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, App. No.
18705/06, 106 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number) (awarding £7,500 in
non-pecuniary damages); Grosaru, App. No. 78039/01, In 64, 68 (awarding £5,000 in nonpecuniary damages for distress-far less than the claimed £1.5 million).
221.
Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, App. No. 9103/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288, 33031 (2008); see also Aliyev, App. No. 18705/06, IT 102-03 (denying pecuniary damages for the
costs of running in the election).
222.

Georgian Labour Party, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 331; see also Paschalidis,Koutme-

ridis & Zaharakis, App. Nos. 27863/05, 28028/05,

41-42 (awarding £1,000 to each

applicant for distress but noting also that "le constat de violation fournit par lui-meme une
satisfaction equitable suffisante pour le dommage moral subi").
223.
Paschalidis,Koutmeridis & Zaharakis,App. Nos. 27863/05, 28028/05, IT 44-46.
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Note uses the term "quasi-legal" because the foundational documents of
international organizations224 and the standards applied by those organizations in the field225 are not obligatory, but rather descriptive and
226
aspirational. Many states still eschew international election monitoring
as an interference with sovereign rights, and, as such, international election monitoring still occurs by invitation only.227 Increasingly, however,
invitations are extended almost pro forma:228 "Observation of national
elections, plebiscites and referenda to monitor procedural fairness, violations of basic political and human rights around tied to electoral
contestation, and even campaign financing in countries claiming to be
democratic, has become the international norm, and has reached a high
,229
degree of institutionalization." State practice has thus eroded somewhat the sovereignty concerns: "[I]t is . . . valid to argue that the greater

prominence of international election watching entails a redefinition of
what sovereignty means in international politics .

...

[S]overeignty has

been partially transformed by the recent emergence of [international
election monitoring]." 23 0 These principles and the state practice of inviting and permitting electoral observation has prompted some scholars to
declare that a right to democratic governance including free and fair
elections is in an emerging entitlement in and of itself: "[T]he sources of
democratic norms are now three-fold: human rights treaties containing
participatory rights clauses, the practice of international election monitors, and the proliferation of participatory mechanisms in international
regulatory regimes."23 '
224.
See, e.g., Charter of Paris for a New Europe, supra note 104; Copenhagen Document, supra note 104.
225.
See sources cited supra note 2.
226.
See Fox, supra note 7, at 571 ("This lack of an explicitly normative function for
election monitoring may be attributed, at least in part, because U.N. election monitoring activities preceded the development of the international human rights treaties.").
227.
BEIGBEDER, supra note 8, at 15; see also United Nations Dep't of Political Affairs,
Electoral Assistance Div., Context and Objectives, U.N. ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/frenchlelectoral-assistance/ea-content/eacontext.htm
(last
visited Sept. 4, 2010); United Nations Dep't of Political Affairs, Electoral Assistance Div.,
Preconditionsfor Assistance, U.N. ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/
french/electoralassistance/eacontent/eapreconditions.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (noting that states must send written request for assistance and await U.N. evaluation of whether
assistance is needed and desired by contesting political parties and representatives of civil
society).
228.
BEIGBEDER, supra note 8, at 15; see also Franck, supra note 7, at 75 ("Requesting
international monitoring ... will likely become an increasingly routine part of national practice, particularly useful whenever the democratic legitimacy of a regime is in question.").
229.
Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of
Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 51, 110 (2009).
230.
SANTA-CRUZ, supra note 3, at 2.
231.
Fox, supra note 25, at 303. But see Christina Cerna, Universal Democracy: An
InternationalLegal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 289,
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Although there is some overlap between the international human
rights instruments and the international observers' standards,232 the "parallel systems of participatory rights" have "no formal linkage."233
Furthermore, there are enforcement problems in that "a 'rule' that only
applies self-selectively has far less legitimacy than one of general appli,,234
cation.
International election observation missions have no
enforcement power, and have no legal obligation to address reported
breaches. Thus, domestic courts and international pressure remain the
dominant means by which to enforce the back-end rights of voters and
candidates. While the standards are there, an international legal obligation to support either the complainants, the population as a whole, the
international community, or the courts in enforcing the back-end aspect
of the right to "genuine" or "free" elections is still emerging.
Thus, even putting aside the difficulties of enforcing human rights
norms that are commonly recognized, such enforcement would seem
limited--even in the democratic entitlement literature 23-to
front-end
236
electoral rights. Therefore, although the International Court of Justice
has suggested that there is nothing in international law that prevents a
state from signing an international instrument legally binding it to adopt
and maintain a particular form of government (namely, democracy), 237
the role of elections as the only articulated right therein and the
292-93 (1995) (noting that no such obligation is recognizable in the international human
rights system).
232.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
233.
Fox, supra note 7, at 588.
234.
Franck, supra note 7, at 81.
235.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. This Note does not explore the validity of
a claim to democratic entitlement. Such an analysis is beyond its scope. However, while there
does seem to be a "regional customary international law" of free elections in Europe, DeFeis,
supra note 69, at 337, the proliferation of democracies in name but not substance and the fact
that states such as China and Pakistan have not acceded to the ICCPR suggest that the democratic entitlement argument remains evolutionary, Niels Petersen, The Principleof Democratic
Teleology in InternationalLaw, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 33, 56 (2008). For criticisms of and
caveats to the democratic entitlement theory, see generally Byers & Chesterman, supra note
37; Lori Fisler Damrosch, PoliticsAcross Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence
over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1989); Wheatley, supra note 8, at 233.

236.

In the democratic entitlement literature, those rights are universally recognized:

[A] review of global and regional treaty systems reveals that a free, fair and legally
sufficient election consists of the following four elements as a matter of treaty law:
universal and equal suffrage; a secret ballot; elections at reasonable periodic intervals; and an absence of discrimination against voters, candidates, or parties.
Fox, supra note 7, at 570; see also Franck, supra note 7, at 69 ("The evolution of textual determinacy with respect to the electoral entitlement is a relatively recent development. In
practice, however, the monitoring component of the entitlement has a long history [in colonial
monitoring, the United Nations, OAS, and CSCE].").
237.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 121 (June 27).
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acknowledged ability for elections to conform in text but not in spirit
with the legal obligations of ICCPR Article 25 and ECHR Article 3 allows the enforcement of such obligation to remain frustrated.
III. UKRAINIAN SUPREME COURT DECISION OF DECEMBER 3, 2004:
INTERPRETING BACK-END ELECTORAL
RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW

The expanding but still-limited scope of the right to genuine elections in international human rights law has largely left the resolution of
elections that allegedly do not reflect the will of the people to either international and domestic political forces or to domestic judicial
2381
institutions. In Europe, the ECtHR's uncertain relief---coming years
after the electoral dispute has been resolved-and limited forms of remedy maintain pressure on domestic and diplomatic forces to resolve
contested elections within a more immediate timeframe and without the
support of an international legal framework.239 However, as evidenced by
ECtHR cases like Aliyev and Kovach,2 4 the capacity of the adjudicative
electoral commissions and judiciaries of many states to adequately and
impartially address electoral disputes is not always present or perceived
as legitimate.241 This lack of institutional capacity is exacerbated by the
authoritarian or transitional nature of many of the democracies of the

238.
See, e.g., Yushchenko, supra note 17 (ordering a repeat election of the 2004 presidential ballot in Ukraine); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding defacto the outcome of
the 2000 U.S. presidential election by resolving the issues presented in this case); Steve Crawshaw & Vesna Peric Zimonjie, Yugoslavia Ballot Must Be Rerun, Court Rules, INDEPENDENT
(Oct. 5, 2000), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/yugoslavia-ballot-must-bererun-court-rules-635135.html; Fisher, supra note 6 (reporting on Italy's Supreme Court
determination of electoral results); Mexico Court Declares Calderon Winner of DisputedElection, Lopez Obrador Vows to Form Parallel Gov't, DEMOCRACY Now! (Sept. 6, 2006),
http://www.democracynow.org/2006/9/6/mexico-courtdeclarescalderonwinner-of; Steven
Lee Myers, Ukrainian Justices, in Show of Independence, Order New Runoff, N.Y. TIMES

(Dec. 3, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/03/internationalleurope/03cnd-ukraine.html;
Polgreen, supra note 6 (reporting on the Nigerian Supreme Court's resolution of the 2007
contested election).
239.

See supra Part I.B.

240.
See Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 18705/06,
19-21 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 8,
2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number); Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02, 9 15, 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7,
2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number).
241.
See, e.g., Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence and JudicialReview in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422 (2003) (analyzing, inter
alia, the perceived effectiveness--or lack thereof-of post-Communist courts in resolving
political disputes).
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242

states in which elections are often disputed. In such states, judges may
lack the judicial independence to make decisions contrary to the ruling
elite and lack the experience, resources, or underlying legal structure to
properly consider claims brought by disenfranchised voters or unsuccessful candidates.243 Further frustrating the realization of back-end
electoral rights through domestic courts are the high stakes that these
determinations carry. The nation and the world are watching, thereby
putting increased pressure on the judiciary and further blurring the lines
between law and politics.244 It is no coincidence that the volume of cases
alleging Article 3 violations increased dramatically after the postCommunist states of Central and Eastner Europe began to accede to the
European Convention in the early 1990s and, most noticeably, following
a spate of controversial elections in the mid-2000s.245 Additionally, the
Court's docket would have been even greater-and back-end electoral
rights brought even more to the fore-if Article 3 guaranteed free and
246
fair elections of both executive and legislative officers.
Thus, the stress levied on the judiciary and the general hesitance to
insert the courts into a political dispute247 demonstrates the vulnerability
of the right to a lack of enforcement under either international or domestic law. A more robust and more widely recognized international legal
framework surrounding the right to free elections, however, could bolster
domestic courts and cabin political actors in such a way as to provide
better legal protection for back-end electoral rights as well as to facilitate
political resolution of electoral disputes. By relying on international law,
domestic courts could displace some of the political pressure-from the
electorate, the international community, and the candidates and their operations-and provide a framework for resolving such disputes in a more
politically neutral venue. As international enforcement is weak, indeterminate, and dependent on political will, the domestic courts could step in
242.
Id. at 422-23 ("[T]he development of an independent judiciary can be constrained
by a weak institutional legacy, limited training and support for judges, and the strength of
other political actors. If the judiciary does not have the authority to make independent decisions, democratic progress may falter .....
See id.
243.
244.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 186
(1997).
See supra note 139.
245.
246.
The challenged elections in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004)
involved presidential elections. See supra note 139.
247.
Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, Courts in Democratic Transitions, Address at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Apr. 3-6, 2003) (on file with author)
("[T]he most overt and direct form of judicial intervention into the political process is when
the court rules on the validity of elections. Indeed, when the court intervenes directly into the
electoral process, with the potential to change outcomes, this represents the most extreme
form of the judicialization of politics.").
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and play a significant role in developing a legal framework for enforcement and establishing a norm of free and fair elections, at least for the
foreseeable future until the right develops into customary international

law. 248
The December 3, 2004 decision of the Civil Chamber of the Ukrainian Supreme Court during the 2004 Orange Revolution offers
an interesting illustration of how such an interplay between international
and domestic constitutional law can facilitate the protection of and
adherence to the right to genuine elections when back-end electoral
rights are infringed. 249 The Ukrainian legal community, and the Civil
Chamber in particular, which until 2005 was the highest appellate chamber for all claims under electoral law and was the court of first instance
for all challenges to national Central Election Commission (CEC) deci251
210
sions, was no stranger to ECHR law or challenges to electoral
248.
Custom generally is considered legally binding international law when it is supported by widespread state practice and opinio juris. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 102 (1987) ("Customary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.").
The December 3, 2004, decision is not proscriptive, and this Note does not advocate
249.
that its interpretation provides a desired or even correct interpretation of the right. Indeed, this
Note argues that such a decision could only arise in the peculiar context of the Ukrainian political transition and judicial order.
250.
For an overview of the Ukrainian judicial system and the role of the Civil Chamber
of the Supreme Court, see generally ORHANIZATSIA SUDOVOI VLADY V UKRAINI [ORGANIZA82-89 (A.O. Selivanova ed., 2002); C.M.
TION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN UKRAINE]
TYMCHENKO, SYDOVI TA PRAVOOKHORONNI ORHANY UKRAINY [JUDICIAL AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF UKRAINE] 50-69 (2004). For the electoral law at issue in Yushchenko v. Central
Election Committee, see Verkhovna Rada Ukraini [Supreme Council of Ukraine], "Pro vibory
Prezydenta Ukrainy" [Law "On the elections of the President of Ukraine"], Zakon No. 1630IV (2004) (Ukr.), available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-binlaws/main.cgi?nreg=1630-15.
251.
The monthly chronicle of the Supreme Court, Visnyk Verkhovnoho Sudu Ukrainy,
contains a section devoted to updates of ECHR law and pending cases against Ukraine. See
generally VISNYK VERKHOVNOHO SUDU UKRAINY KoNsTITUTsu [HERALD OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF UKRAINE]; see also S.R. Tahiyev & M.V. Mazur, Zastosuvannya v Ukrayini Konventsiyi pro zakhnist pray i osnovnyck svobod lyudyny [Application of the Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Ukraine], 9 VISNYK VERKHOVNOHO SUDU
UKRAINY [HERALD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UKRAINE] 31 (2004) (discussing the ECtHR's
treatment of Article 3). As of November 2004, the ECtHR had decided Kovach against and
Babenko for Ukraine in 2002 and 1999, respectively, and the high-profile and politically
charged Melnychenko had been decided against Ukraine just the previous month, on October
19, 2004. See Melnychenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 17707/02, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 784 (2006);
Kovach v. Ukraine, App. No. 39424/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number); Babenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 43476/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 1999), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number)
(decision on admissibility). Ukraine has been party to a disproportionate number of Article 3
cases in the ECtHR. Since acceding to the ECHR in 1996, the ECtHR has ruled on nine cases
brought against Ukraine. See Soproun v. Ukraine, App. No. 39402/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 16,
2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number) (decision on admissibility) (struck from docket); Vitrenko & Others v.
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results.252 Most importantly, as is the case with many post-Communist
constitutions, the Ukrainian Constitution incorporates provisions of international human rights treaties, including the ECHR.253 Article 71,
regarding elections reflects both ICCPR and ECHR language:
Elections to bodies of state power and organs of city selfgovernment are free and held on the basis of universal, equal and
direct suffrage and by secret ballot.
Voters are guaranteed the free expression of their will.254
Note that the placement of the right in the individual ("Voters are
guaranteed . . ."), rather than the imposition of obligations upon the state,
as in the ECHR ("The High ContractingParties shall . . ."), emphasizes

the individual's possession of that right in a way that Article 3 does
not.255 Furthermore, as does the ICCPR, but not the ECHR, Ukraine's
Constitution grants citizens a right to political participation beyond
Ukraine, App. No. 23510/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number) (decision on
admissibility) (inadmissible); Kopaylo v. Ukraine, App. No. 17203/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 3,
2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using

application number) (decision on admissibility) (struck from docket); Kovach, App. No.
39424/02 (violation found on merits); Druzenko & Others v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 17674/02,
39081/02

(Eur.

Ct.

H.R.

Jan.

15,

2007),

available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/

tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number) (decision on admissibility) (partly inadmissible, determination on the merits pending); Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine,
App. No. 13716/02, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1185 (2007) (no violation found on merits); Melnychenko, App. No. 17707/02 (violation found on merits); Holovaty v. Ukraine, App. No.
43239/98

(Eur.

Ct.

H.R.,

Mar.

16,

2000),

available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/

tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using application number) (decision on admissibility) (inadmissible); Babenko, App. No. 43476/98 (inadmissible). All but two of these cases
stemmed from the 2002 parliamentary elections. How many cases are pending without any
ruling is unknown.
The volume of electoral disputes heard by the courts of general jurisdiction under
252.
the Civil Chamber mushroomed after 1998, when electoral laws allowed participants to challenge procedures and results. In 1998, the courts of general jurisdiction heard 162 cases, and,
in 2002, more than 500. Bohdan A. Futey, The Judiciary in Ukraine and the Rule of Law,
Lecture at the George Washington University "The Orange Revolution: One Year On" Workshop, at 23 (Dec. 2, 2005) (on file with author). The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court
reviewed 116 Central Election Commission decisions arising from the 2002 parliamentary
electoral cycle and heard 317 complaints on electoral fraud in single-mandate constituencies
(only 225 seats were contested). See generally ODIHR, OSCE, UKRAINE PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS 31 MARCH 2002 FINAL REPORT (2002), available at http://www.osce.org/
documents/odihr/2002/05/1293_en.pdf; Futey, supra.
KATARYNA WOLCZUK, THE MOULDING OF UKRAINE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLI253.
TICS OF STATE FORMATION 233 (2001).
KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINY fUKR. CONST.] art. 71 (Ukr.); cf ICCPR, supra note 1,
254.
art. 25; Protocol No. 1, supra note 1, art. 3.
Compare KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINY [UKR. CONST.] art. 71 (Ukr.), with ECHR,
255.
supra note 1, art. 3. See also KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINY [UKR. CONST.] art. 38 (Ukr.) (guaranteeing voters a right to participate in government).
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merely choosing elected officials: "Citizens have the right to participate
in the administration of state affairs, in all-Ukrainian and local referenda,
and to freely elect and to be elected to bodies of state power and local
self government."256 Article 103 of the Constitution also requires that the
president be elected by equal, universal, and direct suffrage by secret
ballot, as prescribed by law.25 7 The textual similarity between the Ukrainian constitutional provisions and the international treaty provisions of
ICCPR Article 25 and ECHR Article 3 makes the Ukrainian decision all
the more informative here.
In 2004, Ukraine held elections for its third president since independence.258 Two members of parliament, sitting Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych and former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, received the
greatest number of votes in the first round of the election, although neither received the fifty-percent necessary to avoid a run-off election. 251
Yanukovych, supported by incumbent president Leonid Kuchma and the
economic oligarchs based largely in eastern Ukraine,26 and Yushchenko,
supported by the Orange coalition of more Western-leaning politicians
261
and parties, met in a run-off election on November 21, 2004. There
were widespread reports of voter intimidation, voter fraud, multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, and other electoral irregularities perpetrated by
263
government officials and by Yanukovych supporters. Following the
election, voters-and the international community-condemned the
electoral results announced by the CEC as fraudulent and as not express.262

256.
KONSTITUTSIYA UKRAINY [UKR. CONST.] art. 38 (Ukr.).
257.
Id. art. 103.
258.
See Adrian Karatnycky, The Fall and Rise of Ukraine's Political Opposition: From
Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution, in REVOLUTION IN ORANGE: THE ORIGINS OF
UKRAINE'S DEMOCRATIC BREAKTHROUGH 29, 30-31 (Anders Aslund & Michael McFaul eds.,
2006).
259.
See ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE'S ORANGE REVOLUTION 112 (2005). For a discussion of the fraudulent voting and tabulating evident during the first round of the election, see
id. at 105-14. Because no candidate received more than fifty percent of the vote in that round,
a run-off election was required. Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy [Supreme Council of Ukraine], "Pro
vibory Prezydenta Ukrainy" [Law "On the elections of the President of Ukraine"], Zakon No.
1630-IV, art.
85
(2004)
(Ukr.), available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgibinlaws/main.cgi?nreg=1630-15.
260.
WILSON, supra note 259, at 12-13.
261.
ASKOLD KRUSHELNYCKY, AN ORANGE REVOLUTION: A PERSONAL JOURNEY
THROUGH UKRAINIAN HISTORY 234-39, 252 (2006); Taras Kuzio, Everyday Ukrainiansand
the Orange Revolution, in REVOLUTION IN ORANGE, supra note 258, at 45, 45-46; WILSON,
supra note 259, at 13-17.
262.
Anders Aslund & Michael McFaul, Introduction:Perspectives on the Orange Revolution, in REVOLUTION IN ORANGE, supra note 258, at 1, 1.
263.
See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 259, at 114-121; DANYLO YANEVS'KYY, KHRONIKA
"POMARANCHEVOI" REVOLYUTSII [CHRONICLE OF THE "ORANGE" REVOLUTION] 85-88, 93100 (2005); see also KRUSHELNYCKY, supra note 261, at 256-93.
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ing the will of the people.2 Yushchenko's supporters organized protests
around the country and set up camp in Kyiv's Independence Square and
265
along its main street. What followed was a popular movement known
as the Orange Revolution, which culminated in Yushchenko's victory in
a repeat second round election on December 26, 2004, as ordered by the
Civil Chamber of Ukraine's Supreme Court in its December 3, 2004,
266
decision.
Yushchenko challenged the CEC results in the Supreme Court, initially seeking an annulment of the CEC's resolution on electoral results,
invalidation of results in two (eastern) regions, which would have given
him outright victory, and a declaration of the winner-himself-based
267
on the re-tabulated results. Yanukovych was permitted to participate as
268
an interested party in the case. After accepting 269into evidence thousands
of documents and interviewing many witnesses -all televised nationally-the Civil Chamber found a series of violations of electoral law and
264.

See, e.g., Ukraine's Supreme Court to Examine Opposition Appeal, RADIO FREE

2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1056059.html. A
listserv compiled by faculty at the University of Ottawa, The Ukraine List, provided consistent
and exhaustive reproductions of both Ukrainian and foreign media coverage of the Orange
Revolution. See Archive of Columns on Ukrainian Elections-2004, STATE COMM. ON ARCHIVES OF UKR. (Nov. 24, 2004), http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Revolution
2004/UKL/photos.php?UKL275 (compiled by Dominique Arel, Univ. of Ottawa) (compiling
relevant issues of The Ukraine List, which included, inter alia, articles from Reuters and The
FinancialTimes, a discussion of coverage by the Russian press, and preliminary reports from
observers).
See, e.g., Nadia Diuk, The Triumph of Civil Society, in REVOLUTION IN ORANGE,
265.
supra note 258, at 69, 78-80; Karatnycky, supra note 258, at 29, 39; KRUSHELNYCKY, supra
note 261, at 282-83; YANEVS'KYY, supra note 263, at 89-92. See generally Pavol Demes &
Joerg Forbrig, Pora-"It'sTime" for Democracy, in REVOLUTION IN ORANGE, supra note 258,
at 85.
For a comprehensive accounting of the events of the Orange Revolution-but not
266.
the role of the Civil Chamber-see generally REVOLUTION IN ORANGE, supra note 258; WILSON, supra note 259; YANEVS'KYY, supra note 263. For a detailed catalogue of the techniques
that the authorities used to fabricate the election result, see generally WILSON, supra note 174.
For consideration of the role of the Civil Chamber in the resolution of the Orange Revolution,
see Posting by Daniel Bilak, daniel.bilak@growlings.com, to Ukr. List (Dec. 3, 2004) (on file
with author); Bohdan Futey, The HistoricDecision of Ukraine'sSupreme Court, 61 UKR. Q. 8,
8-15 (2005); Katharine A. Wagner, Toward Orange Litigation?: Judicial Politics and the Supreme Court in Ukraine, 1996-2005 (Apr. 28, 2006) (unpublished M.Phil. thesis, University
of Oxford) (on file with author).
Yushchenko, supra note 17. The two candidates had previously agreed-in writ267.
ing-to adhere to the decision of the Civil Chamber. Memorandum pro vzayemorozuminnya
mizh uryadom i opozytsiyeyu [Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government and
2005),
22,
(Sept.
TRUTH]
[UKR.
PRAVDA
UKRAINSKA
the Opposition],
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 25,

http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2005/9/22/33748.htm, translated in Petition to the President
of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko, UNIv. OF OTTAWA (Nykolai Bilaniuk trans.), http://www.

ukrainianstudies.uottawa.calukrainelist/ukl363_1.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
Serhii Rakhmanin, The Spirit and the Letter, ZERKALO NEDELI [MIRROR
268.
Dec. 4-10, 2004, http://www.mw.ua/1000/1030/48579/.
YANEVS'KYY, supra note 263, at 176, 185.
269.

WEEKLY],
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breaches of protocol by the CEC, including the electronic fabrication of
1 million votes for Yanukovych during the posting of results on the CEC
website.270 Those violations, the Chamber went on to find, "give grounds
for the conclusion that violations of electoral rights established by Articles 38, 71, and 103 of the Constitution" occurred. 2 7 1 The Civil Chamber
further found that:
Taking into account the impossibility of establishing reliably the
genuine results of the expression of the voters' will in the [November run-off election] by way of repeated tabulation of the
results of the run-off election [and the inability to rely on the tabulation of the first round of balloting in October], the Court
considers it necessary to restore the rights of subjects of the
election process by conducting a repeated ballot in accordance
with ... Article 85 of the Law of Ukraine "On the election of the

President of Ukraine." 272
In ordering a repeat presidential ballot, the Civil Chamber relied on domestic electoral law; Articles 38, 71, and 103 of the Constitution; andsurprisingly-Article 13 of the ECHR,273 which states that "[e]veryone
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity."274
On the same day, the Civil Chamber issued a special resolution excoriating the actions of the members of the CEC and other unnamed
government officials participating in the electoral process that denied the
Ukrainian voters' rights to a free and fair election, including the backend electoral right to have their votes accurately reflected in the result. 27 5

270.
Yushchenko, supra note 17; see also Futey, supra note 266, at 8-15; Rakhmanin,
supra note 268.
271.

Yushchenko, supra note 17 (author's translation).

272.
Id. (author's translation). The law "On the Elections of the President of Ukraine"
provides for a repeat election in the event that the first-round poll resultes in no candidate
receiving more than fifty percent of the vote. Verkhovna Rada Ukraini [Supreme Council of
Ukraine], "Pro vibory Prezydenta Ukrainy" [Law "On the elections of the President of
Ukraine"], Zakon No. 1630-IV, art. 85 (2004) (Ukr.), availableat http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgibinlaws/main.cgi?nreg=1630-15. It is the same provision pursuant to which the November 21,
2004, run-off election took place. See id.
273.

Yushchenko, supra note 17.

274.

ECHR, supra note 1, art. 13.
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See Decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine on the Results of the Run-Off Election of the President, KHARKIv GROUP FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION, supra note 17

(translating the special resolution that followed the Yushchenko decision but was not published
in official sources).
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In looking to international law for support, the Chamber could not
rely on Article 3 of the ECHR, which is binding on Ukraine as a Contracting Member to the ECHR, because it is limited to legislative
elections.276 However, the use of ECHR Article 13's right to a remedy
provided an alternative means of securing an analogous right based on
the right to free and fair elections found in the Ukrainian Constitution.
Because the ECtHR has interpreted Article 13 so as not to require
the finding of another violation of the Convention before finding a violation of Article 13277 and that the remedy must be "'effective' in practice
as well as in law,"278 it is conceivable that other domestic judiciaries in
Council of Europe states-or the ECtHR itself--could employ this method to enforce electoral rights that fall both outside and within the scope
of Article 3. The dicta emerging from the recent back-end electoral
Labour Party sugrights claims such as Babenko, Kovach, and Georgian
279

gest that the ECtHR is moving in this direction. Moreover, since the
Ukrainian Supreme Court's December 3, 2004, decision ordering new
elections based on Article 13, the ECtHR itself found a violation of Article 13 in combination with Article 3 in Grosaru, in which it also found a
violation of Article 3 alone.280 Although the remedy available to the prevailing applicant in Grosaru was not a repeat election or even significant
compensation, the use of Article 13 to guarantee back-end electoral
rights and to reinforce the importance of neutral and adequate review by
domestic courts of claims of violations of electoral rights aids the development of a legal framework and international norm protecting back-end
electoral rights in Europe. And, therefore, Ukraine's use of Article 13 to
permit equitable relief and Grosaru represent the initial contours of such
a norm.
Article 13 may be necessary, in particular, to address claims of backend electoral rights violations brought by voters who do not have access
to a domestic grievance process for challenging non-representative results. The ECtHR's recent jurisprudence expanding back-end electoral
rights has addressed exclusively claims by candidates. The Court has,
therefore, yet to address how to protect voters' back-end electoral rights
See Protocol No. 1, supra note 1, art. 3; see also supra notes 97-98 and accompa276.
nying text.
Klass & Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214, 238 (1979277.
80).
LEACH, supra note 3, at 341.
278.
See supra Part I.B; see also Boikoski v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
279.
2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 379, 387 (noting that Article 3 enshrines a broader principle of "effective political democracy").
See Grosaru v. Romania, App. No. 78039/01, I] 57-62 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 2,
280.
2010), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search using
application number).
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within the arbitrary and proportional framework. Article 13 could help
voters overcome the hurdle of standing and a lack of a means to exhaust
their Article 3 claims in domestic courts. And, therefore, Ukraine's use
of Article 13 to permit equitable relief and Grosaru together outline the
potential initial contours of such a norm.
CONCLUSION

The concept of back-end and front-end electoral rights is semantically novel but practically inherent in the rights and obligations laid out
in the regional and U.N. human rights treaties. With an emergence of a
democratic ideal-if not yet a universal norm of democratic governance-the perceived legitimacy of sovereigns depends on both electoral
results and on the right to vote and to have one's government determined
by the will of the people. The increasing number of disputed elections
reflects this notion. While international human rights law has been more
willing to identify and address front-end electoral rights, the sensitive
and political nature of back-end electoral rights has impeded the evolution of an international human rights norm addressing those specific
concerns. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR, especially within the past
two decades, has begun to confront and construct a coherent interpretation of these back-end rights. However, the ECtHR's limited jurisdiction,
resources, and available remedies render its ability to establish more
globally recognized back-end electoral rights likewise limited. Until
such customary law emerges, the protection and enforcement of backend electoral rights remains almost exclusively within a state's political
and judicial spheres.

